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FTC V. A CTA VIS: THE PATENT-ANTITRUST
INTERSECTION REVISITED*
GLYNN S. LUNNEY, JR.

In FTC v. Actavis, the Supreme Court determined that courts should
apply a rule of reason analysis to determine whether using a reverse
payment settlement to resolve pharmaceuticalpatent litigation violates
the antitrust laws. Essentially unique to pharmaceutical-patent
litigation, a reverse payment settlement involves a payment from the
patent-holder to generic challengers in returnfor the generics dropping
their challenge to the patent(s) at issue and agreeing to remain out of
the market. Such a settlement agreement enables the patent-holder to
maintain exclusivity in the relevant market and to keep prices of the
associated pharmaceutical higher than they would otherwise be and,
perhaps, higherthan they should be.
This Article uses game theory to explore how the legal rules regarding
antitrust liability shape the terms upon which parties will settle
pharmaceuticalpatent litigation. The Article demonstrates that, in the
absence of any constraints on settlement terms, the parties will settle
such litigation in a manner contrary to the purposes of both patent and
antitrust laws. Prices for patented pharmaceuticals will remain both
high and higher than necessary to foster desirable innovation. Creating
a risk of antitrustliability, by applying a rule of reason analysis to these
settlements, will constrain the terms upon which the parties may
permissibly settle and should do so in a manner likely to promote the
purposes of both patent and antitrust laws. Prices for particular
patented pharmaceuticalsmay remain high, but only when and to the
extent necessary to promote desirable innovation.
Unfortunately, the Court's approachmay not go far enough. Under the
Court's rule of reason approach,parties appear to remain free to settle
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pharmaceuticalpatent litigation using a licensed-entry format. Such a
settlement format effectively duplicates the substance, but not the form,
of the reverse payment format and may lead to prices for patented
pharmaceuticalshigher than necessary to ensure desirable innovation.
To address this risk, the Court may need to go a step further and
effectively require parties to settle pharmaceuticalpatent litigation using
a time of entry format. Under this format, no side payments are made.
Instead, the partiesagree to a date, between the end of the litigationand
the end of the patent's life, at which generic entry may begin. Because
the agreed date of entry should reflect the parties' judgment as to the
likelihood that the patent-holder will otherwise prevail in the litigation,
such a settlement approach should tend to ensure that generic entry is
delayed, and pricesfor the associatedpharmaceuticalremain high, only
to the extent necessary to foster desirableinnovation.
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INTRODUCTION

Antitrust and patent law both seek to advance public welfare,
but there has long been an undeniable tension between them.
Antitrust law seeks to promote public welfare by prohibiting
improperly obtained monopoly power and thereby ensuring
competitive markets and pricing. Patent law seeks to promote the
public welfare by providing incentives for the creation and disclosure
of those inventions that satisfy its standards for patentability. Patent
law provides these incentives by granting an inventor the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling her patented invention.'
This set of exclusive rights enables an inventor, at least in some
instances, to exclude would-be competitors from a market and to
charge a price somewhat above competitive levels for her patented
invention. This supracompetitive pricing can provide the incentive
necessary for an inventor to recoup her costs. By doing so, it can
ensure that the patented invention at issue is devised and disclosed.
At the same time, however, this supracompetitive pricing stands in
sharp contrast to the competitive pricing that antitrust law seeks to
ensure in markets generally.2
In its most recent iteration,' the Supreme Court revisited the
patent-antitrust intersection in FTC v. Actavis.4 In Actavis, the Court
confronted the question of whether an agreement by the parties to
resolve pharmaceutical-patent litigation through the use of a reverse
payment settlement unreasonably restrained trade in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade
1. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers
to sell, or sells any patented invention within the United States ... during the term of the
patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
2. In his dissent in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., Chief Justice Roberts summarized this
tension: "The point of antitrust law is to encourage competitive markets to promote
consumer welfare. The point of patent law is to grant limited monopolies as a way of
encouraging innovation." FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (Roberts, CJ.,
dissenting).
3. For cases illustrating the longstanding tension between patent and antitrust law,
see, for example, United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 189-97 (1963) (holding
that a patent cross-licensing agreement to limit competitive entry constituted an antitrust
violation); United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 376-80 (1952) (holding that
using patent licenses to fix prices in a market constituted an antitrust violation); United
States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 315 (1948) (reversing the dismissal of an antitrust
claim based on the cross-licensing of patents to fix prices in a market); Standard Oil Co.
(Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 168-83 (1931) (holding that pooling patents in
order to fix prices in a market violates the antitrust laws).
4. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
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Commission Act. Essentially unique to litigation between
pharmaceutical patent-holders and their would-be generic
competitors,5 a reverse payment settlement involves a payment from
the pharmaceutical patent-holder to the generic drug company. In
return for this payment, the generic agrees to drop its challenge to the
patent at issue and to remain out of the patent-protected market for
some period of time, perhaps until the patent at issue expires.
The stakes for the parties, and for consumers, in this type of
pharmaceutical-patent litigation are large. In Actavis itself, three
generics had challenged the patent protecting the market for
Androgrel.6 Had the generics succeeded in their patent challenge and
entered the market, the generic versions of the pharmaceutical would
have cost consumers only a small fraction of the price for the
patented, brand-name version.' The availability of lower-priced
generics would have cut the brand-name pharmaceuticals' sales by
90% and would have reduced its profits by $125 million annually.'
Rather than face that possibility, the patent-holder in the case, Solvay
Pharmaceuticals, agreed in 2006 to pay the generic challengers a share
of its expected monopoly profits, and in return the generic challengers
agreed to drop their challenges to Solvay's patents and to remain out
of the market until 2015.'
5. 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST 15-15 to 15-45 & n.161 (2d

ed. 2010) ("[W]here only one party owns a patent, it is virtually unheard of outside of
pharmaceuticals for that party to pay an accused infringer to settle the lawsuit."). But see
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2242-43 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's claim
that reverse payment settlements are unique to pharmaceutical-patent litigation "is not
supported empirically by anything the majority cites" and is impossible to prove given that
most settlements of patent litigation are confidential). We have data on reverse payment
settlements in the pharmaceutical-patent-litigation context but not in other patent
contexts because Congress, as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act, required parties to file such settlements with the FTC. Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173,
§ 1112, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461-63. As a result, we know that reverse payment settlements
occur in the context of pharmaceutical-patent litigation but cannot definitively determine
whether they occur elsewhere.
6. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229.
7. FTC Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 133 S. Ct.
787 (2012) (No. 12-416); see also FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY: How DRUG COMPANY PAYOFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 8 (2010) [hereinafter FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY],

available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drugcompany-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staffstudy/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf (estimating that the average price for a patented
pharmaceutical will fall by 77% within a year of generic entry).
8. FTC Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 6.
9. Id. at 6-7. The patent at issue did not expire in 2015. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229
(noting that the August 31, 2015 agreed entry date was sixty-five months before the patent
at issue expired). Rather, 2015 was the date by which Solvay anticipated shifting its
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Nor was the settlement at issue in Actavis unique. In a 2010
study, the Federal Trade Commission estimated that reverse
payment, or "pay-for-delay," settlements were protecting at least $20
billion in sales of brand-name pharmaceuticals from generic
competition.o By keeping generics out, these agreements kept prices
for the brand-name pharmaceutical artificially high and thereby cost
American consumers $3.5 billion annually." As these agreements
became popular as a means for resolving pharmaceutical-patent
litigation, wholesalers, retailers, health insurers, and consumers, along
with the FTC, began to challenge them as antitrust violations under
section 1 of the Sherman Act as well as section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act." They argued that but for the reverse payment
settlement, the patent litigation would have continued;" had the
litigation continued, strong patents might have prevailed, but weak
patents would have been struck down. 4 Striking a patent down would
allow generics to enter the market and would quickly lead to sharply
lower prices for the pharmaceutical at issue. 5 In their view, parties to
pharmaceutical-patent litigation were using reverse payment
settlements to insulate weak patents from challenge in order to
maintain supracompetitive pricing without justification and split the
resulting rents.
The parties to these agreements, on the other hand, insisted that
a reverse payment settlement did not unreasonably restrain trade;
indeed, they contended that such a settlement did not restrain trade
at all.' While the settlement may have kept a generic out of a market,
customers to a new product with no generic equivalent. FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra

note 7, at 6.
10. FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 7, at 2.

11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227 (challenging reverse payment settlement as a
violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act); In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig.,
686 F.3d 197, 202-08 (3d Cir. 2012) (alleging a reverse payment settlement violated section
1 of the Sherman Act in wholesaler and retailer class actions); In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (alleging that reverse
payment settlements violated section 1 of the Sherman Act in a suit brought by advocacy
groups as well as direct and indirect purchasers).
13. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229-30 ("The [circuit] court recognized that, if the
parties to this sort of case do not settle, a court might declare a patent invalid.").
14. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012) ("According
to the FTC, the reverse payment settlements unlawfully protected or preserved a
monopoly that likely was invalid and that should not be shielded from antitrust attack."),
rev'd sub norn. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
15. See, e.g., id. at 1305 (noting the generic company's forecast that "its generic
version of AndroGel would sell for about 25 percent of the price of branded AndroGel").
16. Id. at 1301 (describing drug companies' argument that holding the reverse
payment settlement at issue to be a restraint on trade "would weaken incentives for
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this restraint of trade flowed not from the parties' agreement but
from the patent itself." A litigant's agreement to settle and stay out of
the patent-protected market simply acknowledged the already
existing exclusionary force and anticompetitive potential of a
presumptively valid patent. Moreover, given the risk, uncertainty, and
expense associated with pharmaceutical-patent litigation, the parties
should have leeway to settle these cases without incurring antitrust
liability. While paying a generic defendant to drop its challenge might
seem to suggest that a pharmaceutical patent-holder lacks confidence
in its patent, a pharmaceutical patent can be exceedingly valuable. As
a result, a patent-holder, even one confident that it will win the
litigation, will often be willing to pay in order to insure against even a
small risk of invalidity. A large reverse payment should not therefore
be taken as proof that the settlement unreasonably restrains trade.
Unless the court essentially re-litigates the patent infringement claim
within the context of the antitrust suit, there is no way to separate
legitimate settlement agreements from those that might be
improperly insulating weak patents from attack."
As these cases made their way through the court system, the
circuit courts reached diametrically opposed conclusions as to
whether reverse payment settlements violated the antitrust laws.19
investing in drug development, which would reduce the number of life-saving or lifeenhancing innovations that benefit consumers").
17. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065-66 (11th Cir. 2005)
("By their nature, patents create an environment of exclusion, and consequently, cripple
competition. The anticompetitive effect is already present."); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva
Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003) ("If [the patent holder] had a lawful
right to exclude competitors, it is not obvious that competition was limited more than that
lawful degree by paying potential competitors for their exit.").
18. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 204 (2d Cir. 2006)
(pointing out that the legality of patent settlements turns on "assessing the behavior of the
defendants at the relevant time: when they were entering into the Settlement Agreement"
when attempting to determine the "reasonableness of agreements under the antitrust
laws" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
19. Academic commentary is similarly split. For articles condemning reverse payment
settlements, see generally David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The
Antitrust Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321 (2000) (discussing why patent settlements
generally raise competitive concerns, especially in the pharmaceutical context); Einer
Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEx. L. REV. 283 (2012)
(noting problems with reverse payment settlements and advocating for a proof "to
determine when a reverse payment settlement is necessarily anticompetitve"); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlements of Intellectual
Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719 (2003) (discussing antitrust concerns inherent in
patent settlements and arguing that "exclusion payments that exceed ligation costs should
be presumptively illegal"); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J.
ECON. 391 (2003) (discussing the "benefits and costs of patent settlements" and arguing
that "antitrust limits on such settlements are unquestionably needed to prevent abuse of
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The Third Circuit, with some support from the D.C. and Sixth
Circuits, held that such a settlement agreement presumptively
restrained trade and thus violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.20 The Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits, on the other hand,
disagreed. They evaluated the legality of these agreements using a
"scope of the patent" approach. As the Eleventh Circuit explained,
under this approach, a reverse payment settlement agreement was
generally "immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive
effects [fell] within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the
patent."2 Under this approach, a reverse payment settlement would
violate section 1 of the Sherman Act only if: (i) the agreement
extended beyond the patent's exclusionary scope, either to reach
noninfringing products or to extend the exclusion beyond the patent's
term; (ii) the patent at issue had been acquired by fraud on the Patent
the settlement process"). For articles rejecting or warning of the dangers of antitrust
scrutiny for reverse settlement payments, see generally Roger Blair & Thomas Cotter, Are
Settlements of Patent Disputes Illegal Per Se?, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 491

(2002)

(concluding that applying a per se presumption of illegality to patent settlements is
inappropriate in part because the settlements are usually "between parties that are not
necessarily horizontal competitors"); Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy
Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on
Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57
(2010) (arguing that reverse payment settlements are not inherently bad, "that the effects
of reverse payments are not obvious, can be procompetitive, and that a presumption of
anticompetitive effect is thus unwarranted"); Bret M. Dickey & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Would the Per Se Illegal Treatment of Reverse Payment Settlements Inhibit Generic Drug
Investment?, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 615 (2012) (arguing that "a per se rule against
'reverse payment' patent settlements could chill the incentives for generic investment" and
therefore "deprive consumers of benefits from lower cost generic drugs"); James
Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Intellectual Property and Agreements to Settle Patent Disputes:
The Case of Settlement Agreements with Payments from Branded to Generic Drug
Manufacturers, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 777 (2003) (arguing that settlements may stimulate
development incentive, protect patent holders' intellectual property rights, and therefore
"fi]n many circumstances, a strict per se illegal treatment of such payments
would ... reduc[e] total consumer welfare in the long run").
20. The Third Circuit enunciated the standard as follows:
Specifically, the finder of fact must treat any payment from a patent holder to a
generic patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the market as prima facie
evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade, which could be rebutted by
showing that the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2)
offers some pro-competitive benefit.
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012). The D.C. and Sixth Circuits
have also held that a similar settlement arrangement violated section 1. See In re Cardizem
CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 906 (6th Cir. 2003); Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp.
Int'l, 256 F.3d 799, 810-11 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
21. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1312; see In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323, 1332-37 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at
212-13; Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1065-66; Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1311-12.
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and Trademark Office ("PTO"); or (iii) the patent infringement
claims were "objectively baseless" and hence a "sham." 22
The Court granted certiorari in Actavis to resolve this split and in
its opinion, rejected both approaches.2 3 Using a reverse payment
settlement to resolve pharmaceutical patent litigation was neither
presumptively lawful nor presumptively unlawful, the Court held.24
Rather, a court must apply a rule-of-reason analysis25 to determine
whether any given reverse payment settlement violates the antitrust
laws." While the Court left "to the lower courts the structuring of
the ... rule-of-reason" in these cases, the Court identified the size of

the reverse payment as a central consideration. On its own, a very
large reverse payment, one that is substantially more than simply
avoided litigation costs, can show the actual adverse effect on
competition necessary to establish a rule-of-reason violation.2 8 Unless
the pharmaceutical patent-holder can show that the excessive
payment actually represented something legitimate, such as a
payment for other services that the generic agreed to provide, a court
may justifiably infer that a reverse payment settlement represented an
unlawful agreement to purchase market exclusivity." While the Court
did not finally resolve whether the reverse payment settlement at
issue in Actavis itself did or did not violate the rule of reason, the
Court's focus on the size of the reverse payment as a key factor in the
rule-of-reason analysis will likely make it more difficult for parties in

22. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1312; In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1332-37; In
re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212-13.
23. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234-38 (2013).
24. Id.
25. As a general matter, the rule of reason examines the pro-competitive and anticompetitive consequences of an agreement to determine whether, on balance, the
agreement unreasonably restrains trade. In the Second Circuit, for example, the rule-ofreason analysis is a three-step process:
First, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the challenged action
has had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market.
Then, if the plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the
pro-competitive redeeming virtues of the action. Should the defendant carry this
burden, the plaintiff must then show that the same pro-competitive effect could be
achieved through an alternative means that is less restrictive of competition.
Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
26. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234-38.
27. Id. at 2238.
28. Id. at 2234-37.
29. Id. at 2237.
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the future to settle pharmaceutical patent litigation using a reverse
payment structure.
This Article carefully examines the law and economics of reverse
payment settlements and evaluates whether the Court's ruling
advances or disserves the not-entirely-consistent purposes of the
antitrust and patent laws. Part I sets forth the relevant background
that led to the rise of reverse payment settlements to resolve
pharmaceutical-patent litigation and contrasts the differing positions
the circuit courts initially reached on their legality. Part II then turns
to, and examines, the Court's decision in Actavis, summarizing the
issues it resolved and the issues it left open. Part III evaluates the
settlement of pharmaceutical patent litigation from a game-theoretic
perspective. As we shall see, game theory largely vindicates the
Court's decision. By looking at why and how parties will settle under
various possible rule regimes, game theory demonstrates that the
Court's approach should promote the purposes of both the patent and
antitrust laws.
Yet, the Court's decision may not go far enough. As we shall see,
the Court's decision is unlikely to resolve completely the use of
settlement agreements to insulate weak pharmaceutical patents from
attack. Reverse payment settlements may be a symptom, but they are
not the disease itself. If weak pharmaceutical patents can be insulated
from attack, they generate substantial rents. Those rents give the
parties a very strong incentive to settle in a manner that preserves a
weak patent and allows them to split the associated rents between
themselves. If they can find a way to accomplish that without running
afoul of the antitrust law, we should fully expect them to do so. As a
result, even if the Court's ruling effectively prohibits the use of
reverse payments, this will not be the end of the issue. The parties will
likely find some alternative arrangement that achieves the same
anticompetitive result. For example, the patent-holder could license
generic entry, use vertical price fixing to maintain prices in the
associated market, and use the royalty structure to divide the rents
between the parties. Part IV examines what might be done to cure
this disease, rather than merely treat its symptoms. To do so, we must
define a rule regarding reverse payments specifically, and permissible
settlement terms more generally, that leads the parties in
pharmaceutical-patent litigation to settle in a manner that advances
the goals of both patent and antitrust laws.
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I. SETTING THE STAGE: THE RISE OF REVERSE PAYMENT
SETTLEMENTS
A.

PharmaceuticalPatents and Hatch-Waxman
To set the stage, we begin with the background legal rules that
govern pharmaceutical patent litigation. In most industries, patent
litigation begins when one company begins selling a product or using
a process that another believes infringes on one or more of its
patents.' While pharmaceutical-patent litigation could arise in this
fashion, it does not typically.31
In the pharmaceutical industry, a company may not simply start
selling a prescription drug. It must first obtain approval from the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA").32 To obtain such approval
for a new drug, the company must submit a New Drug Application
("NDA") that provides "substantial evidence" establishing the
medication's safety and efficacy." Since the efficacy requirement was
added in 1962, the FDA has consistently required double-blind,'
placebo-controlled clinical trials to establish efficacy." "Isolated case
reports, random experience, and reports lacking the details which
30. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2006).
31. In his opinion in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, Judge Sack made
much of this difference. 446 F.3d at 207; see also Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d
1056, 1074 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that Hatch-Waxman essentially redistributes the
relative risk assessments of the cost of entry and damages); In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that the
Hatch-Waxman Act "has the unintended consequence of altering the litigation risks of
patent lawsuits"). He argued that it "essentially redistributes the relative risk assessment"
found in patent litigation and may well give the generic "the whip hand." In re Tamoxifen,
446 F.3d at 207, 210. Yet, it is the patent-holder's choice whether or not to sue in response
to a paragraph IV certification. If the patent-holder believed that it would be better off
doing so, it could simply ignore the paragraph IV certification and wait for actual generic
entry to sue.
32. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012) ("No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction
into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant
to subsection (b) or (j) of this section is effective with respect to such drug.").
33. The Kefauver Harris Amendment added the efficacy requirement to the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act in 1962. Act of Oct. 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781 §§ 102-103, 76
Stat. 780, 783-83; see also Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609,
615 (1973) (noting when the 1962 amendments became effective and NAS-NRC
undertook to appraise the efficacy of drugs).
34. In a double-blind study, neither the patient receiving the medication nor the
doctor prescribing it knows whether any given patient is receiving the study medication or
the placebo.
35. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (d) (requiring "substantial evidence" of efficacy for drug
approval and defining "substantial evidence" to mean "evidence consisting of adequate
and well-controlled investigations"); 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2013) (defining the requirements
for "adequate and well-controlled studies").
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permit scientific evaluation" are insufficient to establish a
medication's efficacy.36 As part of the NDA, the applicant must also
identify any patents that would protect the new drug.37 If the FDA
approves the new drug as safe and effective, the FDA publishes those
patents in the "Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations," usually referred to as the "Orange
Book."" The clinical trials necessary to obtain FDA approval for a
new drug are expensive, and there is always a risk that the FDA will
reject the evidence presented as insufficient to establish the
medication's safety and efficacy. The requirement of FDA approval
thus makes the process of bringing a new drug to market long,
arduous, and risky.39
In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act, more commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman
Act, to set up a process that allowed for and encouraged early generic
entry.4 The Hatch-Waxman Act made two changes to existing law to
facilitate early generic entry. First, to reduce the time and expense
associated with introducing a generic version of an existing
pharmaceutical, the Hatch-Waxman Act created an "Abbreviated
New Drug Application" ("ANDA").4 1 With an ANDA, a generic
36. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(e).
37. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) ("The applicant shall file with the application the patent
number and the expiration date of any patent which claims the drug for which the
applicant submitted the application or which claims a method of using such drug and with
respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person
not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.").
38. See, e.g., Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676
(2012).
39. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2012) ("Only one in
every 5,000 medicines tested for the potential to treat illness is eventually approved for
patient use, and studies estimate that developing a new drug takes 10 to 15 years and costs
more than $1.3 billion."), rev'd sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). The
Eleventh Circuit offered these numbers to suggest why we need patent protection for
pharmaceuticals. See id. at 1300 ("No rational actor would take that kind of a risk over
that period of time without the prospect of a big reward."). Yet, the Eleventh Circuit is
mistaken as to the causal direction. We do not need a patent system because
pharmaceutical companies spend large sums of money on developing and obtaining
approval for new drugs; rather, pharmaceutical companies spend large sums of money on
developing and obtaining approval for new drugs because we have a patent system.
40. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585; see also In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 203 (2012) ("In
1984, attempting to jumpstart generic competition with name brand pharmaceuticals,
Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,
commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act."(citing Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(1984))).
41. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act § 101, 98 Stat. at 158589.
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drug company need only show that it contains the same active
ingredient(s) and is bioequivalent to a previously approved drug.42
Having done so, it may then rely on the FDA's determination of
safety and efficacy with respect to that previously approved drug to
establish the safety and efficacy of the generic.4 3 Because it can rely
on the prior FDA approval, the generic manufacturer can avoid the
considerable expense and uncertainty associated with filing its own
NDA.
As part of an ANDA, the generic manufacturer must also certify
that the proposed generic does not infringe any patent listed with the
FDA, and published in the Orange Book, for the drug at issue.,
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, an ANDA applicant may satisfy this
requirement by certifying: (i) that no patent information has been
filed; (ii) that the patents identified have expired; (iii) that the ANDA
applicant will wait until the identified patents expire, setting forth the
relevant expiration date(s); or (iv) that the patent is invalid or will not
be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic version of
the drug at issue.45 The final option is known as a "paragraph IV"
certification. Filing such a certification constitutes an act of patent
infringement, and the generic drug company must give notice to the
patent-holder of any such paragraph IV certification.' When the
pharmaceutical patent-holder receives notice of a paragraph IV
certification, it has forty-five days in which to file a patent
infringement suit.47 If it does so, the filing of the lawsuit triggers an
automatic stay that prevents the FDA from approving the ANDA for
the generic drug until the earlier of: (1) thirty months; or (2) the date
on which the district court finds that the patent is either invalid or not
infringed.'
Second, in addition to establishing ANDAs and defining a
specific patent-litigation framework for them, Congress also provided
a special incentive for generics to challenge pharmaceutical patents.
42. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv).
43. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4); see also Caraco Pharm. Labs., 132 S. Ct. at 1676
("[The Hatch-Waxman] amendments allow a generic competitor to file an abbreviated
new drug application (ANDA) piggy-backing on the brand's NDA. Rather than providing
independent evidence of safety and efficacy, the typical ANDA shows that the generic
drug has the same active ingredients as. and is biologically equivalent to, the brand-name
drug.-).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A), (j)(2)(A)(vii).
45. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2012).
47. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5).
48. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(1).

2015]

PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION

387

Specifically, the Hatch-Waxman Act gives the first company that files
a generic ANDA with a paragraph IV certification a 180-day period
from the time at which the generic enters the market during which the
FDA will not approve subsequent ANDA applications.49 When first
enacted, the FDA interpreted the Hatch-Waxman Act so as to limit
the award of the 180-day generic exclusivity to those generics that
successfully defended their paragraph IV certifications against a
lawsuit for patent infringement.so However, in 1998, the D.C. Circuit
rejected this interpretation."1 In response, the FDA abolished the
successful defense rule and currently awards the exclusivity period to
the first ANDA applicant who asserts a paragraph IV certification.52
If more than one generic drug company files an ANDA with a
paragraph IV certification on the same day, the FDA considers them
all "first filers" who share the exclusivity period." Nevertheless, the
180-day exclusivity period is available only to the first filer. If the first
filer loses its 180-day exclusivity period, for example, by withdrawing
its ANDA,5 4 the right to claim the 180-day exclusivity period will not
pass to subsequent filers."
Congress provided this 180-day generic exclusivity period as a
special incentive to encourage challenges to pharmaceutical patents. 6
In part, Congress provided the incentive to overcome a collective
action or externality problem that plagues patent litigation generally.
As generally recognized, most of the benefit from successfully
defending against a claim of patent infringement, whether by proving
the patent invalid or by showing non-infringement, does not flow to

49. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
50. 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1) (1995).
51. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Granutec,
Inc. v. Shalala, Nos. 97-1873, 97-1874, 1998 WL 153410, at *7 (4th Cir. April 3, 1998).
52. See Effective Date of Approval of an Abbreviated New Drug Application, 63 Fed.
Reg. 59,710, 59,710 (Nov. 5, 1998) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.107 (1999)).
53. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(1I)(bb); FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY
EXCLUSIVITY WHEN MULTIPLE ANDAS ARE SUBMITTED ON THE SAME DAY 4 (2003).
54. In 2003, Congress defined certain "forfeiture event(s)" that would cause the first
applicant to forfeit its 180-day exclusivity. 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(D)(i)-(ii).
55. 21 U.S.C. § 355()(5)(D)(iii).
56. See, e.g., Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisionsfor Pharmaceuticals:Have
They Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 403-04, 423 (1999) ("The entire purpose
of the 180-day exclusivity provision, at the time it was drafted, was to insure that one
generic competitor would not get a free ride on the litigation effort of another generic
competitor until the party who had borne the cost and risk of litiontion had a fair
opportunity to recover its litigation costs.").
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the victorious patent defendant." While prevailing means that a
defendant can keep selling the product at issue, it also clears the way
for other would-be competitors to sell the same product. Under
principles of collateral estoppel, a finding of invalidity or noninfringement against one defendant is binding on the patent-holder in
all subsequent litigation." Thus, to enter the market, other would-be
competitors may simply follow the path the first defendant blazed. By
opening the door for other would-be competitors, one defendant's
win quickly leads to a competitive market generally-a market where
we expect prices to fall to marginal cost. As a result, most of the
benefits from successfully defeating a claim of patent infringement
flow not to any one patent defendant, or even to all potential
defendants, but to consumers generally, in the form of lower prices. 9
Despite the public interest in having the validity of patents
litigated,' we should not expect the typical patent defendant to
litigate simply because consumers or society generally would be
better off if a given patent were invalidated. A typical defendant will
instead pursue its own self-interest. Given that it receives only a small
part of the total benefit from invalidating a patent, in the absence of
some special incentive to litigate, many patent defendants will settle,
rather than litigate, even in cases they are likely to win.6' The 180-day
ban on the approval of other ANDAs can provide the necessary
incentive to encourage a generic to litigate.
We should be careful, however, before relying too heavily on this
collective action justification for the 180-day generic exclusivity
57. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that
when a generic defendant prevails in patent litigation, "consumers, rather than generic
producers, are typically the biggest beneficiaries").
58. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971)
(recognizing non-mutual collateral estoppel in patent litigation and holding that a
patentee is estopped from asserting a patent against a defendant after a court has found
the patent invalid in litigation involving another defendant); John R. Thomas, Collusion
and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposalfor Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REv. 305, 333-34.
59. See, e.g., In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 208 ("The FTC estimates that about one year
after market entry an average generic pharmaceutical product takes over ninety percent of
the patent holder's unit sales and sells for fifteen percent of the price of the name brand
product. This price differential means that consumers, rather than generic producers, are
typically the biggest beneficiaries of generic entry." (citation omitted)).
60. See U.S. v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 57 (1973); see also id. at 58 ("It is as
important to the public that competition should not be repressed by worthless patents, as
that the patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly.").
61. See FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that even with a high
chance of winning, there are a variety of factors that lead many generic pharmaceutical
manufacturers to settle, rather than litigate patent claims).
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period. Although generally asserted, this collective action problem is
often not present, or at least is less pronounced, in pharmaceuticalpatent litigation compared to patent litigation generally. For
pharmaceutical patents to enter the market, a would-be competitor
must both clear the patent and obtain FDA approval. Even though a
first generic challenger has won its litigation and begun marketing its
generic version of the pharmaceutical, subsequent generics still must
obtain FDA approval to begin marketing. If the initial litigation
invalidated all claims of the listed patents, subsequent ANDA filers
may rely on the initial generic's success to obtain FDA approval. Yet,
the initial litigation often does not invalidate every claim of the listed
patents.62 Only some of the claims may be asserted, or the initial
generic challenger may prove non-infringement, rather than
invalidity. When that happens, the pharmaceutical patent-holder may
still have a valid basis to list the patents in the Orange Book. As long
as some patents remain listed in the Orange Book for the new drug at
issue, the FDA will not approve other ANDAs until the filers have
prevailed in their own litigation. While the doctrine of collateral
estoppel will be available, a follow-on generic competitor will
nonetheless need to assert the doctrine, show that it applies, and
prevail before it will obtain FDA approval. As a result, even in the
absence of the 180-day generic exclusivity, the delays in obtaining
FDA approval may offer the initial generic challenger some time in
which to recoup its investment in litigating the patent issues.
Although the collective action problem is therefore somewhat
less serious for pharmaceutical patents, Congress provided a special
incentive to challenge pharmaceutical patents, but not patents
generally. That Congress provided such a special incentive to
encourage challenges to pharmaceutical patents, and not patents
generally, suggests that pharmaceutical patents, particularly weak
pharmaceutical patents, impose uniquely high costs on society.
Pharmaceutical patents impose uniquely high costs for several
reasons. While every patent provides exclusivity, in order to enable
some degree of supracompetitive pricing, exclusivity is likely to lead
to disproportionately high prices with pharmaceutical patents. In part,
62. See, e.g., Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Leavitt, 484 F. Supp. 2d 109, 121 (D.D.C. 2007)
("Patent holders seeking FDA approval must register their patent with the FDA. 21
U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). In the present case, Pfizer maintains its patent via 11 independent
claims. FDA Decision at 9. In the patent infringement litigation currently before the
Federal Circuit, Pfizer challenged Apotex's certification as to claims 1-3 of its patent. Id.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit's ruling encompasses an invalidation of only the first
three claims of Pfizer's patent-it is silent as to the remaining claims.").
63. See, e.g., id. at 121-22.
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this is due to the nature of the markets for pharmaceuticals.
Pharmaceuticals can have radically low cross-elasticities of demand.'
When there is only one pharmaceutical that can treat or cure a
serious or fatal disease or condition, patients are willing to pay almost
anything for access to that medication. Moreover, in demanding and
offering to pay for access to that medication, a patient can draw not
only on her own earning potential but also, given the ubiquity of
health insurance, the earning potential of every other individual in
her health insurance pool. This means that pharmaceuticals can have
prices radically higher than equally valuable inventions in other
sectors of the economy.65 At the same time, the phrase "deadweight
loss," which economists use to describe the decreased satisfaction
consumers experience when they cannot afford a supracompetitive
price, takes on a far more literal connotation in the markets for
pharmaceuticals.
In addition to these differences in the nature of the markets for
pharmaceuticals, there is also a substantial difference in the
effectiveness of patent protection. Specifically, patents in
pharmaceutical markets are likely to prove far more effective at
excluding would-be competitors than patents in other markets.
Because the FDA regulates entry into pharmaceutical markets, there
are only two ways to enter such markets legally. First, the would-be
competitor can use the ANDA approach and offer a generic version
of the pharmaceutical at issue.' But to do so, the would-be
competitor must prove that its formulation has the same active
ingredient(s) and is bioequivalent, leaving little room to vary the
generic version sufficiently to avoid a claim of patent infringement."
64. See, e.g., Matthew Herper, The World's Most Expensive Drugs, FORBES (Feb. 22,
2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/19/expensive-drugs-cost-business-healthcare-rarediseases.html ("The nine drugs on our list all cost more than $200,000 a year for the
average patient who takes them. Most of them treat rare genetic diseases that afflict fewer
than 10,000 patients. For these diseases, there are few if any other treatments. So biotech
companies can charge pretty much whatever they want.").
65. As discussed, the FTC found an average decline of 77% in pharmaceutical prices
following the loss or expiration of patent protection and consequential generic entry. See
FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 7, at 8. 1am not aware of any other markets where the
loss or end of patent protection leads to a remotely comparable price decrease.
66. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
67. If the patent is to the medication's active ingredients (known as a "compound"
patent), then a generic could not contain the same active ingredients without falling within
the patent's scope. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 398 (2d Cir.
2005) ("Zeneca's tamoxifen patent is not a formulation patent, which covers only specific
formulations or delivery methods of compounds; rather, it is a patent on a compound that,
by its nature, excludes all generic versions of the drug."). If the patent instead is directed
only to the specific formulation, coating, or delivery method for the compound, then a
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Second, a would-be competitor can undertake its own research in an
attempt to identify a non-infringing pharmaceutical to treat the same
disease or condition." However, using this approach would require
the would-be competitor to file its own NDA. By attempting to
compete by offering its own new drug, rather than a generic version
of a previously approved drug, the company may not rely on the
ANDA alternative and, as a result, would have to pay for its own set
of clinical trials to prove the new drug's safety and efficacy. Although
such alternatives sometimes develop, the introduction of a second
new drug into a market often entails significant delay" and, in
addition, does not usually lead prices to fall as far as they would with
generic entry. The developer of the new pharmaceutical has to ensure
that prices remain sufficiently high to cover the considerable risk and
expense associated with obtaining FDA approval for its own new
drug.
In contrast, to enter markets in other fields where patents are
available, neither exact copying nor expensive clinical trials are
necessary. Rather, would-be competitors have far more leeway to
invent around and offer non-infringing, yet still competing, products. 0
As a result, patents tend to prove more effective at excluding wouldbe competitors from pharmaceutical markets. We can get some sense
for this difference by looking at renewal data. While all patents today
may last twenty years from their application date, to obtain the full
term the patent-holder must pay a renewal fee at three and a half,
seven and a half, and eleven and a half years to keep the patent in
force." Where patent-holders allow most non-pharmaceutical patents
to lapse after the second renewal payment,72 pharmaceutical patent-

generic may plausibly argue non-infringement even though it is bioequivalent and contains
the same active ingredients.
68. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2012).
69. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that
developing a new drug takes ten to fifteen years), rev'd sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
70. Edwin Mansfield, Mark Schwartz & Samuel Wagner, Imitation Costs and Patents:
An Empirical Study, 91 ECON. J. 909, 913 (1981) ("Contrary to popular opinion, patent
protection does not make entry impossible, or even unlikely. Within 4 years of their
introduction, 60% of the patented successful innovations in our sample were imitated.");
see also id. at 913 & 914 n.1 ("In the bulk of the cases, the new product could have been
imitated in 2 years or less even if the imitator carried out the project at the most leisurely
pace. In practically all cases it could be imitated in 3 years or less.").
71. 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2012).
72. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1495, 1504 (2001) (presenting in Table 3 data showing that patentees pay the maintenance
fees due twelve years after the patent issues for less than 40% of the patents issued).
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holders routinely renew their patents for the full twenty-year term."
Alternatively, we can look directly at the rents patents generate and
their resulting value. In their book, Patent Failure, Jim Bessen and
Mike Meurer used econometric techniques and estimated that "the
aggregate value of United States patents granted to private United
States parties in 1991 was about $4.4 billion in 1992 dollars."74 In
contrast, I have estimated that losing patent protection for the
antidepressant Prozac, for only thirty-four months out of the patent's
seventeen-year life, cost Eli Lilly $3.27 billion." Despite the
differences in estimation techniques, the disproportionate value of
pharmaceutical patents is readily apparent.
Patents on pharmaceuticals, while they can encourage the
development of new, potentially life-saving medications, thus entail
some unique costs. Given their unique costs, some countries, such as
India, simply refused, for many years, to provide patent protection for
pharmaceuticals. 6 While the Agreement on Trade Related Aspect of
Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") forbade countries from taking that
approach, today, in every developed Western country other than the
United States, governments balance the unique costs and benefits of
providing patent protection for pharmaceuticals by imposing price
controls on pharmaceuticals.78 So far, the pharmaceutical industry in
the United States has persuaded the government not to follow that
course.7 9 Instead, the government has attempted to deal with the

73. See Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 153637 (2005) (showing that pharmaceutical and drug patents are more likely to be maintained
for the full patent term than patents in other technology fields).
74. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 112 (2008).
75. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., On the ContinuingMisuse of Event Studies: The Example of
Bessen and Meurer, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 35, 46 (2008).
76. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation
of India's Patent System and the Rise of Indian PharmaceuticalInnovation, 68 U. PIT. L.
REV. 491, 491-92 (2005) (noting that India's patent law excluded patent protection for
pharmaceuticals from 1972 to 2005).
77. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, art. 27(1), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
154 ("[P]atents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to
the ... field of technology. . . .").
78. See, e.g., Jonathan Ingram, Eliminating Innovation: How Price Controls Limit
Access, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 115, 115-18 (2011) (discussing various price control schemes in
other countries).
79. See, e.g., Matthew Arnold, Obamacare Reconsidered: A Pretty Good Deal for the
Drug Industry, MED. MARKETING & MEDIA (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.mmmonline.com/obamacare-reconsidered-a-pretty-good-deal-for-the-drugindustry/article/233750/ ("But in the end, the industry was able to use its leverage to fend
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uniquely high costs that pharmaceutical patents, particularly weak
pharmaceutical patents, can impose by encouraging early generic
entry.' To that end, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a less
expensive, special application process for FDA approval of generics
and provides an incentive, in the form of the 180-day generic
exclusivity, for generics to challenge weak pharmaceutical patents.'
B.

Hatch-Waxman Derailed

.

Yet, the Hatch-Waxman approach has not worked out precisely
as Congress hoped. While some early generic entry has occurred, the
parties to pharmaceutical-patent litigation quickly discovered that
they could both be made better off by agreeing to a reverse payment
settlement rather than litigating. Almost as quickly, they began facing
lawsuits asserting that such settlements violated section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.
In the first pair of antitrust cases involving reverse payments, the
Sixth and D.C. Circuits concluded that a reverse payment agreement
violated the antitrust laws.82 Both cases concerned an agreement
between a pharmaceutical patent-holder and a generic with respect to
Cardizem CD, a heart medication." In September 1995, the generic,
Andrx Pharmaceuticals, filed an ANDA, and in December they made
the paragraph IV certification.' Within forty-five days, the patentholder sued, triggering the thirty-month automatic stay on FDA
approvals of any ANDAs directed towards Cardizem CD. 5 While the
stay was pending, in mid-1997, the FDA issued a tentative approval of
Andrx's ANDA-an approval that would become final when the
automatic stay ended." In response, the pharmaceutical patent-holder
agreed to pay the generic $40 million per year, beginning on the date
on which the FDA gave the generic final approval and ending on the
date that the generic either entered the market or was found liable for
off provisions that would have allowed direct price controls and restricted drug
marketing.").
80. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,
2647 (noting Act sought "to make available more low cost generic drugs by establishing a
generic drug approval procedure for pioneer drugs").
81. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417 § 101, 98 Stat. 1585, 1589.
82. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 914 (6th Cir. 2003); Andrx
Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256 F.3d 799, 819 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reversing district
court's dismissal for failure to state a claim and remanding for trial).
83. In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 901-04; Andrx Pharm., Inc., 256 F.3d at 804.
84. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 256 F.3d at 803.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 803-804.
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patent infringement in the pending litigation." Somewhat curiously,
the agreement did not settle the litigation between the parties but left
it pending. This curiosity had a purpose, however. By leaving the
litigation pending, the parties allowed Andrx to hold onto the 180-day
generic exclusivity period and created a bottleneck that prevented the
FDA from approving any other generic.' When final approval of
Andrx's ANDA came on July 3, 1998, the pharmaceutical patentholder began making payments to Andrx under the parties'
agreement, and Andrx, in return, withheld its generic from the
market. 89 It was not until nearly a year later, in June 1999, that the
parties settled their litigation, Andrx began marketing its generic, and
the 180-day bar on generic approvals began to run.' As a result of the
parties' agreement, other generics could not obtain FDA approval to
enter the market until December 1999.91
Although the two cases arose in somewhat different procedural
contexts,' both courts concluded that the agreement constituted a
horizontal agreement to eliminate competition and allocate market
share13-in the words of the Sixth Circuit, "a classic example of a per
se illegal restraint of trade." 94 Although both courts expressed
particular concern that the agreement created a bottleneck that
prohibited FDA approval of other generics, their reasoning suggested
that, even in the absence of the bottleneck, the reverse payment itself
constituted a means of illegally buying market share." Both courts
specifically rejected the argument that the existence of a patent
insulated the parties' agreement from antitrust challenge.' As the
Sixth Circuit explained:
87. Id. at 803.
88. Id. at 804.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. In Andrx Pharmaceutical,Andrx had sued other generics to clarify its right to the
180-day generic exclusivity. One of the generics, Biovail, counterclaimed, asserting
violations of section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id. at 804. The district court
dismissed the counterclaim, concluding that Biovail could not establish causal antitrust
injury. Id. Thus, the appeal focused on whether Biovail had adequately pleaded causal
antitrust injury. Id. In contrast, in In re Cardizem CD, various purchasers of Cardizem CD
had brought class-action litigation challenging the agreements as an antitrust violation. In
re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 896 (6th Cir. 2003). The appeal arose after
the district court granted summary judgment in the plaintiffs' favor, concluding that the
undisputed facts established a per se violation of section 1. Id.
93. In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 908; Andrx Pharm., Inc., 256 F.3d at 811.
94. In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 908.
95. See id.; Andrx Pharm., Inc., 256 F.3d at 811.
96. In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 908; Andrx Pharm., Inc., 256 F.3d at 811.
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It is one thing to take advantage of a monopoly that naturally
arises from a patent, but another thing altogether to bolster the
patent's effectiveness in inhibiting competitors by paying the
only potential competitor $40 million per year to stay out of the
market. 1
In short, using a reverse payment to insulate the patent from
challenge and to preserve the patent-generated rents violated the
antitrust laws.
Yet, in the next round, the victor's laurel passed, as it were, from
antitrust to patent law. In the five years following the Sixth Circuit's
decision in In re Cardizem CD,"8 three circuit courts, the Eleventh,
the Second, and the Federal, considered antitrust challenges to
reverse payment settlements, and each rejected the antitrust claims as
a matter of law.99 In these courts' view, a reverse payment settlement
was effectively immune from antitrust scrutiny as long as the scope of
the market exclusion in the settlement did not exceed the potential
scope of the patent(s) at issue.'" If the settlement agreement barred
the generic from entering the market for longer than the patent's
term, or if the agreement barred the generic from introducing noninfringing products, then it was subject to antitrust scrutiny but, as a
general rule, not otherwise. If the settlement's exclusionary scope did
not exceed the patent's potential scope, then antitrust liability could
be found in only two instances: (1) where the patent was acquired by
fraud on the PTO; and (2) where the claims of patent infringement
were "objectively baseless," and the litigation a sham.' 0

97. In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 908.
98. 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
99. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012), rev'd sub nom.
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochoride Antitrust
Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1324, 1332-37 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2006); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056,
1065-66 (11th Cir. 2005); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294,
1308-10 (11th Cir. 2003).
100. See Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1076 ("What we must focus on is the
extent to which the exclusionary effects of the agreement fall within the scope of the
patent's prosecution. Here, we find that the agreements fell well within the protections of
the [] patent, and were therefore not illegal.").
101. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213; see Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1312
("Our ... decisions establish the rule that, absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the
patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long as its
anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.").

396

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

For these courts, if the litigation was not a sham, and the patent
was not obtained by fraud, there was nothing illegitimate about
paying to preserve a patent.10 As the Tamoxifen court explained:
[S]o long as the patent litigation is neither a sham nor otherwise
baseless, the patent holder is seeking to arrive at a settlement in
order to protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a lawful
monopoly over the manufacture and distribution of the
patented product. 103
True, a willingness to pay to preserve a patent could be taken to
"betray[] a fatal disbelief in the validity of the patent or the likelihood
of infringement,"" but patent litigation is inherently long, complex,
and uncertain. Even a patent-holder relatively confident as to its
chances may want "to insure against the possibility that its confidence
is misplaced, or ... that a reviewing court might (in its view) render
an erroneous decision."os
While acknowledging the "troubling dynamic" of reverse
payment settlements,'t 0 these courts emphasized the general judicial
policy favoring settlement.'
A commitment to encouraging
settlement might leave room for settlements that "protect patent
monopolies that are, perhaps, undeserved."' Yet, the market, and
not courts, could deal with that potential problem directly. By paying
off one generic challenger, a patent-holder signals a lack of
confidence in its patent that will only encourage other challengers.'"
102. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1309 ("To the extent that the appellees have
demonstrated nothing more than subsequent invalidity, we hold that this alone is
insufficient to render the patent's potential exclusionary effects irrelevant to the antitrust
analysis.").
103. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 208-09.
104. Id. at 210.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 211. ("We are not unaware of a troubling dynamic that is at work in these
cases. The less sound the patent or the less clear the infringement, and therefore the less
justified the monopoly enjoyed by the patent holder, the more a rule permitting settlement
is likely to benefit the patent holder by allowing it to retain the patent.").
107. Id. .at 211-12 ("[S]ettlement of patent litigation is not only suffered, it is
encouraged for a variety of reasons even if it leads in some cases to the survival of
monopolies created by what would otherwise be fatally weak patents.").
108. Id.
109. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2235 (2013) ("But, one might ask, as a
practical matter would the parties be able to enter into such an anticompetitive
agreement? Would not a high reverse payment signal to other potential challengers that
the patentee lacks confidence in its patent, thereby provoking additional challenges,
perhaps too many for the patentee to 'buy off?' "). Congress had also amended the HatchWaxman Act in 2003 to provide for forfeiture of a first filer's claim to the 180-day
exclusivity period to eliminate the bottleneck that the exclusivity period otherwise might
present. Id. at 2234-35.
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While a patent-holder might be able to pay off a second or third such
challenger, "[t]he point will come when there are simply no monopoly
profits with which to pay the new generic challengers.""o Allowing
parties to use reverse payment settlements will therefore not delay
the reckoning for weak patents for long, or so these courts believed."'
In the end, as long as the settlement did not exceed the patent's
potential scope of exclusion, "[w]hatever damage is done to
competition by settlement is done pursuant to the monopoly
extended to the patent holder by patent law."" 2 Given a choice, then,
between vindicating the purposes of the antitrust laws and those of
the patent laws, these courts chose to vindicate the purposes of patent
law.
While there was considerable tension between the conclusions of
the Sixth and D.C. Circuits, and those of the Second, Eleventh, and
Federal Circuits, the Third Circuit's decision in In re K-Dur Antitrust
Litigation"3 in 2012 made the circuit split undeniable. In its decision,
the K-Dur court expressly rejected the "scope of the patent" test that
the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits had embraced." 4 In its
stead, the K-Dur court required "a quick look rule of reason
analysis.""' Under the "quick look" approach, in the context of
110. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212.
111. As one district court explained:
If courts do not discount the exclusionary power of the patent by the probability of
the patent's being held invalid, then the patents most likely to be the subject of
exclusion payments would be precisely those patents that have the most
questionable validity. This concern, on its face, is quite powerful. But the answer
to this concern lies in the fact that, while the strategy of paying off a generic
company to drop its patent challenge would work to exclude that particular
competitor from the market, it would have no effect on other challengers of the
patent, whose incentive to mount a challenge would also grow commensurately
with the chance that the patent would be held invalid. Moreover, it is unlikely that
the holder of a weak patent could stave off all possible challengers with exclusion
payments because the economics simply would not justify it. It could, therefore, be
expected that the market would correct for any bolstering of flagrantly invalid
patents by way of exclusion payments.
In re Ciproflaxin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 534-35 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd, 544 F.3d 1323 (2d Cir.
2008); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical
Competition, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 11, 25 (2004) ("In a world in which there are numerous
firms willing and able to enter the market, an exit payment to one particular infringement
defendant need not have significant anticompetitive effects. If there is good reason for
believing the patent invalid others will try the same thing.").
112. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212-13.
113. 686F.3d197(3dCir.2012).
114. Id. at 214.
115. Id. at 218.
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pharmaceutical-patent litigation,"' a reverse payment would
constitute "prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of
trade."" A pharmaceutical patent-holder could rebut this primafacie
case "by showing that the payment (1) was for a purpose other than
delayed entry or (2) offers some pro-competitive benefit.""'
In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit emphasized that
while patents are presumed valid, the presumption of validity is
merely a procedural device, not a substantive right."' It shifts the
burden to the defendant to prove a patent's invalidity, but it does not
foreclose an invalidity result. Indeed, such results are common.120 In
the court's view, we should not foreclose finding an antitrust violation
on the grounds that a valid patent already bars competition in the
market because the validity and scope of the patent is precisely what
was at issue in the underlying litigation before the settlement.121 As
for the possibility that a sufficient number of additional challengers
will come forward to ensure that weak patents are eventually struck
down, the court expressed its doubts.122 As the court noted, by this
point, we had already seen cases where a pharmaceutical patentholder had used its patent-generated rents "to pay off a whole series
of challengers."' As for the final argument in favor of the "scope of
the patent" test, the court acknowledged "the judicial preference for
settlement." 24 Yet, "while generally laudable," that preference is
grounded in neither statutes nor the Constitution and must give way
in the face of "countervailing public policy objectives or, in this case,
Congress's determination . . . that litigated patent challenges are
necessary to protect consumers from unjustified monopolies by name
brand drug manufacturers." 25 1In any event, the court continued,

116. Id. at 216 ("We caution that our decision today is limited to reverse payments
between patent holders and would be generic competitors in the pharmaceutical
industry.").
117. Id. at 218.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 214.
120. Id. at 215 (citing an FTC study in which generic challengers prevailed 73% of the
time in Hatch-Waxman litigation and Professor Kimberly Moore's study in which
defendants prevailed 42% of the time in patent cases that reached trial).
121. Id. at 201-02.
122. Id. at 212.
123. Id. (citing King Drug Co. v. Cephalon, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2010),
where the pharmaceutical patent-holder had successfully bought off four generic
challengers).
124. Id. at 213.
125. Id. at 217.
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parties remain free to settle; they just may not use a reverse payment
as part of that settlement without risking antitrust liability.126
With the stage thus set and a clear conflict between the circuits
presented, the issue was ripe for Supreme Court review. All that
remained was to await a suitable case. The wait was not long. In April
2012, the Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in FTC v. Watson
Pharmaceuticals.2 71In its complaint, the FTC alleged that several
reverse payment settlements involving the patented pharmaceutical,
Androgel, amounted to "unlawful agreements not to compete in
violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act."' 28
Applying its "scope of the patent" test, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed
the FTC's complaint for failure to state a claim.129 In response, the
FTC petitioned for certiorari, and the Court granted it.' 30
II. THE COURT ACTS
By a five-to-three vote,'3 1 the Court reversed the Eleventh
Circuit and held that the FTC had adequately set forth a claim that
the settlement agreements at issue unreasonably restrained trade and
thus violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
("FTCA").3 2 In doing so, it rejected the presumptive legality of such
settlements under the scope of the patent test.'3 At the same time, it
also rejected the presumptive illegality of such settlements, under
either the Third Circuit's approach or the FTC's position that courts
reviewing such agreements should apply a "quick look" analysis.'34
Rather than adopting either of these approaches, the Court held that
reverse payment settlements should be evaluated under the rule of
reason.13s

126. Id. at 217-18 (noting that the parties may settle "based on a negotiated entry date
for marketing of the generic drug").
127. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), rev'd sub nom. FTC v.
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
128. Id. at 1305.
129. Id. at 1309, 1312.
130. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013).
131. Justice Alito did not take part in the Court's consideration or decision of the case.
Id. at 2238.
132. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012) (explaining unlawfulness
of unfair methods of competition and prevention by the FTC).
133. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (holding that the fact that the anticompetitive effects of
the settlements fall within the patent's potential exclusionary scope does not "immunize
the agreement from antitrust attack").
134. Id. at 2237.
135. Id. at 2237-38.

400

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

While the Court left the precise structure of the rule of reason
inquiry to the trial court on remand,' 6 the Court did not leave the
matter entirely up in the air, as it were. In its analysis, the Court
emphasized that the size of the reverse payment itself can provide
evidence of both market power and a weak patent. Unless the
payment "amount[s] to no more than a rough approximation of the
litigation expenses saved" 37 or "compensation for other services that
the generic has promised to perform," 8 a large reverse payment may
"provide strong evidence that the patentee seeks to induce the
generic challenger to abandon its claim with a share of [the]
monopoly profits that would otherwise be lost in the competitive
market." 39 A large reverse payment establishes that the patentholder has "the power to charge prices higher than the competitive
level."'" And "[a]n unexplained large reverse payment would
normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the
patent's survival."l 4' As a result, a large reverse payment on its own
can go far towards establishing a violation of the rule of reason,
without the need to litigate, though an antitrust lawsuit, the likelihood
that the patent-holder would have succeeded or failed on its patent
infringement claim.'42
As for the suggestion that a reverse payment settlement would
attract additional generic challengers and thereby ensure the quick
demise of weak patents in any event, the Court articulated two
reasons for doubt. 4 3 First, only the first filer can claim the 180-day
generic exclusivity under Hatch-Waxman.'" Without the advantage of
the 180-day generic exclusivity, a generic has relatively little to gain
from successfully challenging a patented pharmaceutical. 4 5 A
successful challenge means that it may enter the market, but it also
clears the way for other generics to do so as well. In the face of
general generic entry, the incentive for any one generic to challenge a
patented pharmaceutical may prove insufficient to provoke serious
136. Id. at 2238.
137. Id. at 2236.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2235.
140. Id. at 2236.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2236-37 ("In a word, the size of the unexplained reverse payment can
provide a workable surrogate for a patent's weakness, all without forcing a court to
conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.").
143. Id. at 2235 ("Two special features of Hatch-Waxman mean that the answer to this
question is 'not necessarily so.' ").

144. Id.
145. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
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challenges, even with respect to weak patents."' Second, in addition
to not gaining the 180-day generic exclusivity, a second generic
challenger also faces a thirty-month automatic stay on FDA
approval.'47 Particularly as the clock winds down on any given patent,
a thirty-month automatic delay in entering the market may reduce the
potential rents available to a successful generic challenger to a point
where the challenger no longer justifies the costs of the necessary
litigation."
While the Court recognized "a general legal policy favoring the
settlement of disputes," 49 the Court suggested that alternative
settlement formats remained available that did not run afoul of the
antitrust laws.' Specifically, the Court explained that the parties to
pharmaceutical patent litigation "may, as in other industries, settle in
other ways, for example, by allowing the generic manufacturer to
enter the patentee's market prior to the patent's expiration, without
the patentee paying the challenger to stay out prior to that point.""'
As for the patent-holder's desire to buy peace and thereby insure
that it will not lose its patent as a result of a judicial mistake or its
own misjudgment, the Court held that antitrust law simply trumps
patent law on this issue. As the Court explained:
Although the parties may have reasons to prefer settlements
that include reverse payments, the relevant antitrust question is:
What are those reasons? If the basic reason is a desire to
maintain and to share patent-generated monopoly profits, then
in the absence of some other justification, the antitrust laws are
likely to forbid the arrangement.'5 2
Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Scalia and Thomas,
dissented from the Court's decision.'53 While they disagreed with the
majority on virtually every point, in the end they agreed with the
majority that ultimately it came down to a choice as to which law,
antitrust or patent, would prevail. Yet, where the majority sided with

146. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2243-44, 2246 (Roberts, C., dissenting) (detailing the high legal costs
associated with litigating patent cases and referencing the majority's assertion that
requiring generics "to wait 30 months before receiving FDA approval to market their
drug" will "chill subsequent generics from challenging the patent").
149. Id. at 2234 (majority opinion).
150. Id. at 2234-35.
151. Id. at 2237.
152. Id.
153. Id.at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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antitrust law, the dissent sided with patent law. 5 4 "A patent," Chief
Justice Roberts insisted, "carves out an exception to the applicability
of antitrust laws."'s As a result, in the dissenters' view, in the absence
of sham litigation or fraud, "[t]he correct approach should therefore
be to ask whether the settlement [gave the patent-holder] monopoly
power beyond what the patent already gave it."'' 6
While the majority did not hold that reverse payment settlements
were per se, or otherwise presumptively, illegal under the antitrust
laws, the Court's holding that an unduly large reverse payment can
establish a rule of reason violation will likely chill the future use of
the reverse payment format.' 57 We turn now to a normative
evaluation of the Court's decision. As part of this evaluation, we look
to answer several questions, but one in particular: Can we fulfill the
purposes of both patent and antitrust laws on this issue, or in the end,
must we choose one over the other?
III. EVALUATING THE COURT'S DECISION FROM A GAME
THEORETIC APPROACH: TO SETTLE OR NOT TO SETLE
To evaluate the normative merits of the Court's decision, we turn
to game theory. Rather than rely on intuition and guesswork as to
how and why parties will settle, I use game theory to set up a more
rigorous structure to test how potential pharmaceutical-patent
litigants will react to various rule regimes governing settlement. In
subsection B, I will lay out the basic framework. Before we get there,
however, in subsection A, we begin with an underlying and
fundamental question: Why are some patents weak while others are

strong?
A.

Weak Patents, Strong Patents:Why?

Some patents are weak; some patents are strong. Descriptively,
the meaning of weak or strong is simple. It connotes the likelihood
that any given patent will prevail in litigation. To prevail in litigation,
a patent-holder must overcome whatever invalidity challenges a
defendant asserts and demonstrate infringement. Thus, a patent is
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2246 ("According to the majority, this provision [enjoining the FDA 'from
approving a generic's application to market a drug for 30 months if the brand name sues
the generic for patent infringement within 45 days of that application being filed'] will chill
subsequent generics from challenging the patent (because they will have to wait 30 months
before receiving FDA approval to market their drug).").
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strong if it: (i) is very likely to overcome whatever invalidity
challenges a defendant may assert; and (ii) has sufficient breadth so
that its claims, either literally or by the doctrine of equivalents, are
very likely to encompass any competing product and thus support a
finding of infringement. A patent is weak, on the other hand, if: (i) it
is likely to be found or held invalid; or (ii) even if valid, its claims are
so narrow that they are not likely to encompass many potentially
competing products and, hence, would not be infringed in any event.
That some patents are weak, while others are strong, is not an
accident, nor does it reflect a mistake by the PTO. Rather, variable
patent strength is an integral part of the structure of the patent system
and essential to its goal of ensuring that inventive resources are
allocated to their highest valued use. When we look at the broad
range of inventions that the patent system can bring forth, we find
that some inventions would require the devotion of considerable
time, skill, research, and creativity, given the current state of
technology, to develop. They represent technical problems that are
difficult to solve. They are, in the ordinary sense of the word, hard. In
contrast, other inventions are easy.' They require very little in the
way of time, skill, research, or creativity to develop. Accordingly,
some inventions require extensive patent protection for the inventor
to recover her cost; others require very little or none at all.
The various requirements of patent law, which together define
whether a patent is likely to fail or prevail in litigation, and in that
sense, whether a patent is weak or strong, allow us to tailor the level
of protection provided to each invention to precisely the level needed
to bring it forth. For hard inventions that need something closer to
full patent protection to be brought forth, we tailor the doctrine so
that the patents on such an invention are likely to prevail in litigation.
For easy inventions, which are largely able to recoup their costs
through the ordinary workings of the market, patent law may need to
provide only a slight additional boost to bring such inventions forth.
For such easy inventions, we tailor patent doctrine so that the patents
on such an invention have a chance, but only a small chance, of
prevailing in litigation. Having weak and strong patents thus allows us
to tailor the effective level of patent protection to the difficulty on the
invention at issue. With one patent system, we can simultaneously
provide strong patents to those inventions that are hard, while
providing weak patents to those inventions that are easy. This
158. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patents, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A
Quiet Revolution, 11 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 39-56,68-70 (2004).
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provides a mechanism to match the level of patent protection
provided to the level necessary and sufficient to bring any given
invention forth.
This helps the patent system ensure the efficient allocation of
inventive resources. Otherwise, patent law's one-size-fits-all system of
protection would vastly overprotect some inventions while
underprotecting others. In terms of ensuring an efficient allocation of
resources, either overprotecting or underprotecting an invention is
equally undesirable.'59 If a desirable invention is underprotected, then
the financial returns the patent system provides will prove insufficient
to attract the resources necessary to ensure that the invention is
devised and disclosed. Those resources will flow to something else, to
some other productive activity in the economy that, while it may
generate value, will generate less value than the inventive activity at
issue. The same misallocation arises if the patent system overprotects
a given type of inventive activity. In this case, the patent system
would ensure a financial return far more than that necessary to ensure
that the inventions at issue are devised and disclosed. By offering
such high returns, the patent system would attract too many resources
into the overprotected inventive activity. It would attract resources
into the overprotected inventive activity and drain them from other
uses elsewhere in the economy, even when the other uses would have
generated more value. In this case, the overprotected inventive
activity becomes the less valuable something else to which resources
flow. 1"
Both overprotection and underprotection can thus lead to an
inefficient allocation of available resources and can thereby disserve
patent law's central purpose as a property regime. As we turn our
attention to an evaluation of reverse payment settlements, we should
keep in mind that the goal of the patent system is not to maximize the
financial reward associated with any given invention. Rather, it is to
provide an appropriate reward: one that leads individuals to devote
their resources to the invention at issue if that represents the highest
valued use of those resources, but not otherwise. The various
doctrines of patent law that Congress has enacted and that the courts
159. This is a point that I have established and explored in depth with respect to
copyright law. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright's Price Discrimination Panacea, 21
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 387, 431 (2008); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's
Incentives-Access Paradigm,49 VAND. L. REv. 483, 641 (1996). It applies equally as well to
patent law.
160. For a simple general equilibrium model illustrating this principle, please see
Appendix I.
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have interpreted help us define various patents as either weak, strong,
or somewhere in between in order to ensure such an efficiently
appropriate reward-a reward that tends to ensure that our available
inventive resources are devoted to their highest valued use.
With this background understanding of the patent system in
mind, we turn now to the basic framework for settlement decisions
from a game-theory perspective.
B.

The Basic Frameworkfor Settlement Decisions

When we turn to the choice parties face between litigating and
settling, self-interest will lead parties to settle, rather than litigate,
when settlement terms can be found that make both parties better off
compared to the outcome they each expect from litigating.16 ' To
determine if a proposed settlement would make a party better off, a
party must first determine what it stands to gain or lose from
litigating. In the pharmaceutical context, patent-infringement lawsuits
are usually brought before the generic drug actually enters the
market.'62 For that reason, only injunctive relief, not damages, is
typically at issue.'6 3 The key issue is whether a defendant will or will
not be allowed to enter the associated market. By winning the
litigation, a plaintiff can preserve exclusivity in the market. A
defendant, on the other hand, can ensure its entry by winning. For the
plaintiff, then, the expected outcome from litigating is a function of
three factors: (i) the plaintiff's expected chance of success in the
lawsuit, multiplied by (ii) the present value of the expected rents from
preserving the market in its patent-protected state, less (iii) the
expected costs, fees, and lost productivity that will result from
litigating. Likewise, the expected outcome for the defendant from
161. For the development of game theory models of settlement, see John P. Gould,
The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 1. LEGAL STUD. 279, 279-93 (1973); Keith N. Hylton
& Sungjoon Cho, The Economics of Injunctive and Reverse Settlements, 12 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 181, 181-95 (2010) (extending model to examine settlement where the relief
sought is primarily injunctive rather than damages); William M. Landes, An Economic
Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 61-71 (1971); George L. Priest, The Common
Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65-75 (1977)
(expanding model to allow the parties to hold differing estimates of the plaintiff's
likelihood of success); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12-17 (1984); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law
Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 61-63 (1977).
162. See, e.g., FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC
STUDY 7 (2002).
163. Under section 271(e)(4)(C) of the Patent Act, damages are available in HatchWaxman cases "only if there has been commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale
within the United States . .. of an approved drug." 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(4)(C) (2012).
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litigating is also a function of three factors: (i) the defendant's
expected chance of success in the litigation, multiplied by (ii) the
expected rents that the defendant will earn if it successfully defeats
the patent and enters the market, less (iii) the expected costs, fees,
and lost productivity that will result from litigating.
Given these considerations, we can define the value to the
plaintiff from litigating in a pharmaceutical patent case as:
V, = RX, - C,

(1)

where V, represents the value to the plaintiff from litigating, R
represents the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail, X, represents
the expected present value of the income associated with maintaining
exclusivity in the patented product, and C represents the costs of the
litigation. Similarly, we can define the value to the defendant from
litigating in a pharmaceutical patent case as:
V, = (1 - R)X,) - C,

(2)

where V, represents the value to the defendant from litigating,
and X, represents the expected present value of the income
associated with defeating the claims of patent infringement and
entering the market.
While these equations look symmetric and suggest that the
stakes for the two parties are similar, they are not. In the usual case,
the expected profit to the plaintiff from winning the case, X,, will
usually far exceed, often by an order of magnitude, the expected
profit to the defendant from winning the case, X,.'" The reason for
this is simple. If the plaintiff wins, then it gets to keep the relevant
pharmaceutical market to itself and earn the associated monopoly
profits. If the defendant wins, it may get a 180-day period where the
FDA will not approve other generics, extended perhaps by other
FDA delays, but relatively quickly, a prevailing defendant will face
widespread generic entry and a consequently competitive market.
Once the market becomes competitive, prices will fall to near
marginal cost, and a defendant can expect to earn no more than a
normal rate of return on its investment. As a result, a defendant will
usually have far less to gain than a plaintiff has to lose in this type of
pharmaceutical patent litigation.
To get a sense for the asymmetry in the stakes, consider the
example of the anti-depressant Prozac. Eli Lilly obtained FDA
164. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 209 (2d Cir. 2006).
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approval to market Prozac in 1986, and with Eli Lilly's efforts, it
profitable
popular and
an extremely
became
quickly
pharmaceutical.' In December 1995, Barr Laboratories filed an
ANDA seeking FDA approval to market a generic version pursuant
to a paragraph IV certification.' 66 After losing at the district court,
Barr Laboratories managed to persuade the Federal Circuit that one
of Eli Lilly's patents violated the rule against double-patenting style
non-obviousness. 6 ' As a result, rather than expire as scheduled in
December 2003, the Federal Circuit ruled that Eli Lilly's patent
protection on Prozac would expire thirty-four months early in
February 2001.168 From 1998 through 2001, while protected by
patents, Eli Lilly earned revenue from sales of Prozac in the United
States of just over $2 billion annually.' 9 When its last patents expired,
its revenue from U.S. sales of Prozac fell by almost 80% to just over
$400 million annually.170 If we take this average loss in revenue,
convert sales revenue to income using Eli Lilly's reported gross
margin of 77.7%, and apply a discount rate of 10%, then losing the
litigation and thirty-four months of patent protection cost Eli Lilly
$3.29 billion.
In contrast, despite its victory, Barr Laboratories gained much
less than Eli Lilly lost. According to its SEC filings, Barr Laboratories
received revenues of $367.5 million in its first year selling fluoxetine,

165.
166.
167.
168.

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 222 F.3d 973, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Id.
Id. at 988.
Id.; see also MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES:
How THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 188 (2005). After the August 9,
2000 decision, Eli Lilly received a six-month extension on the first patent at issue,
extending its effective patent protection on Prozac into August 2001. Id. We will use the
thirty-four months, rather than the twenty-eight months, in this analysis to reflect Eli
Lilly's expectations at the time it could have settled the litigation. Using the August 2001
expiration instead would change some of the numbers presented, but it would not change
the normative implications of the analysis.
169. See Eli Lilly & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), Ex. 13, at 2 (Mar. 28, 2002)
("Fluoxetine product sales in the U.S. decreased 26 percent, to $1.66 billion, primarily due
to generic competition for Prozac beginning in early August 2001."); Eli Lilly & Co.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K), Ex. 13, at 2 (Mar. 28, 2001) ("Combined sales of Prozac, an
antidepressant, and Sarafem in the U.S. increased 7 percent, to $2.23 billion."); Eli Lilly &
Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), Ex. 13, at 2 (Mar. 30, 2000) ("Prozac sales in the U.S.
decreased 8 percent, to $2.09 billion."); Eli Lilly & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 14
(Mar. 26, 1999) ("Prozac sales in the U.S. increased 13 percent, to $2.27 billion."). The
data presented here is from my discussion of the Prozac case in an earlier article. See
Lunney, supra note 75, at 45-46.
170. See Eli Lilly & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), Ex. 13, at 2 (Mar. 20,2003).
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the generic version of Prozac."'7 However, in its second year, with the
end of the 180-day generic exclusivity, Bar Laboratories' sales of
fluoxetine dropped to $7.245 million. 172 By winning the litigation, Barr
Laboratories was able to sell its generic formulation for thirty-four
additional months and also received the 180-day generic exclusivity
revenues. 7 1 If we convert revenue to income using an estimated gross
margin for Barr of 80%, and the same 10% discount rate,174 then by
winning, Barr Laboratories earned $294.2 million. While this is a
substantial stake by any measure, it represents less than 10% of the
amount at stake for Eli Lilly.
Using these numbers to illustrate, we can use equations (1) and
(2) to calculate the value to each party from litigating as a function of
the expected chance that Eli Lilly will win the lawsuit. For example, if
both parties estimate that Eli Lilly has a fifty-fifty chance of winning,
then the value to Eli Lilly of litigating is $1.635 billion. This equals its
chance of winning (50%) multiplied by the expected present value of
its income from keeping generics out of the Prozac market for thirtyfour months ($3.29 billion), less the expected litigation costs, which I

171. See Barr Pharmaceuticals Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Aug. 26, 2002)
("In August 2001, we launched our Fluoxetine 20 mg capsule, the generic equivalent of Eli
Lilly's Prozac. For the fiscal year ended June 30, 2002 (fiscal 2002'), sales of Fluoxetine
were $367.5 million, or 31% of total product sales. On January 29, 2002, our 180-day
generic exclusivity period on Fluoxetine ended and, as expected, the FDA approved
several other generic versions produced by other companies. As a result, the selling price
declined dramatically and we lost market share to competing products. Both factors
caused our sales and profits from Fluoxetine to be substantially lower than those earned
during the exclusivity period. Faced with other generic competitors for Fluoxetine, we
expect Fluoxetine to account for approximately 1% of product sales in fiscal 2003.").
172. Barr Pharmaceuticals Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 32 (Aug. 26, 2003)
("Fluoxetine accounted for $7,245 of product sales in fiscal 2003, down from $367,539 in
fiscal 2002 .. . .").
173. As discussed, given the court's decision in Mova Pharmaceuticalsand the FDA's
subsequent elimination of the "successful defense" requirement, Barr Laboratories might
have been able to keep the 180-day exclusivity period by settling. See supra notes 51-52
and accompanying text. Under the current rules regarding the award of the 180-day
generic exclusivity, rather than have or not have the exclusivity period, as would be the
case if winning or losing the litigation are the only possible outcomes, the trade-off for
Barr Laboratories in a litigate-or-settle framework is between the chance of winning and
thereby possibly receiving the generic exclusivity income immediately, but also possibly
losing the case and hence losing the 180-day exclusivity, or settling and waiting to receive
the generic exclusivity income. Under the current rules, by settling, Barr could eliminate
the risk of losing the case and thereby losing the 180-day exclusivity as well.
174. These numbers are intended to be for purposes of illustration only. If we used a
different discount rate, the numbers would change, but the underlying principles and
conclusions would not.
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will assume are $10 million.' 5 In contrast, the value to Barr
Laboratories of litigating is only $137.1 million. This equals its chance
of winning (also 50%) multiplied by the expected present value of its
income from winning ($294.2 million), less its expected litigation
costs, which I will assume are also $10 million. Using this same
mathematical set-up, we can further calculate the value of litigating to
each party as a function of the chance that Eli Lilly will win the
lawsuit. Table 1 presents the results.
Table 1

The Value of Litigating the Prozac Patents as a Function of the
Expected Chance that Eli Lilly Will Win
R
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Value (Lilly)
$3,280,000,000
$2,951,000,000
$2,622,000,000
$2,293,000,000
$1,964,000,000
$1,635,000,000
$1,306,000,000
$977,000,000
$648,000,000
$319,000,000
($10,000,000)

Value (Barr)
($10,000,000)
$19,420,000
$48,840,000
$78,260,000
$107,680,000
$137,100,000
$166,520,000
$195,940,000
$225,360,000
$254,780,000
$284,200,000

As Table 1 reflects, the value of litigating to Eli Lilly falls
steadily as its chance of success falls. The value of litigating to Barr,
on the other hand, runs in the exact opposition direction. But even as
the value of litigating to Barr rises, it remains consistently below that
of Eli Lilly until Barr is virtually certain to win. This large difference
in litigation values is due to the parties' asymmetric stakes. Even
when both parties estimate that Eli Lilly has no better than a 10%
chance of winning the lawsuit, the value to Eli Lilly from litigating to
175. These numbers are meant to be for purposes of illustration only. Again, if we
change the costs of litigation, the numbers would change, but the underlying principles
and conclusions would not. I would note, however, that Barr Laboratories' 2001 Annual
Report estimated its investment in each patent challenge at $8 to $10 million. Barr
Pharmaceuticals Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Aug. 24, 2001) ("Patent
challenges are complex, costly and can take three to six years to complete. They generally
require an investment of $8to $10 million per challenge.").
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keep its monopoly remains higher than the value to Barr of litigating
to enter the market simply because 10% of over $3 billion is more
than 90% of under $300 million.
The parties will settle, rather than see the litigation through,
when they can identify settlement terms that will make both parties
better off vis-A-vis litigating."' Settlement terms can govern the
timing of the generic company's entry, whether immediate, at the end
of the patent's term, or somewhere in between. Settlement terms can
also include payments from one party to the other. Whatever rule our
legal system adopts regarding the legality of reverse payments may
restrict the range of settlement options available and may therefore
limit the parties' ability to identify settlement terms that will make
both better off vis-A-vis the option of litigating. The question is: Can
we devise a rule regarding reverse payments specifically, or
permissible settlement terms more generally, that lead parties in
pharmaceutical patent litigation to settle in a manner that advances
the goals of both the patent and antitrust laws?
C.

Settlement Decisions in the Face of Legal Rules

To examine this question in detail, we will look at how parties to
pharmaceutical patent litigation will react in the face of three possible
rule regimes. When we consider the rule regimes potentially
available, we find, at one extreme, a rule regime that simply prohibits
the settlement of pharmaceutical-patent litigation. Under this rule
regime, once a party initiates pharmaceutical-patent litigation, the
party must see the litigation through. To provide one baseline, this
will be our first rule regime. At the other extreme, we find a laissezfaire rule regime that allows the parties to settle on whatever terms
they like. To provide a second baseline, this will be our second rule
regime. In the context of reverse payments, we will use as a stand-in
for this second rule a simplified version of the Second Circuit's rule in
In re Tamoxifen Citrate.' Under this regime, reverse payments are

generally permitted, so long as the exclusionary scope of the
agreement does not extend beyond the patent's exclusionary scope
and term. Finally, as our third rule regime, we will explore the
176. This follows from the general assumption in economics that parties act in their
own self-interest.
177. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006)
("[Aibsent an extension of the monopoly beyond the patent's scope ... the question is
whether the underlying infringement lawsuit was 'objectively baseless in the sense that no
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits'....Payments, even
'excessive' payments, to settle were therefore not necessarily unlawful.").
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variable time of entry settlement approach the Court suggested in
Actavis. Under this regime, reverse payments are prohibited, but the
parties can vary the time at which the generic may enter the market
from immediate entry until the end of the patent's term. Using these
various rule regimes, we can examine how the rule regime changes
which cases settle and also examine how the resulting settlements
impact the competing goals of the patent and antitrust regimes.1
Ideally, what we are looking for is a rule regime that will lead parties
to settle or litigate in a manner that ensures that prices in the
associated market remain high enough, but only just high enough, to
ensure desirable innovation.
1. Settlement Rule Regime #1: No-Settlements
We start at one extreme and ask what would happen if the law
prohibited settlement of pharmaceutical-patent litigation altogether.
Knowing this to be the rule, parties will take somewhat greater care
before they begin down a path that may lead to patent litigation. A
generic drug company will file a paragraph IV certification for an
ANDA only if it is prepared for the lawsuit that may follow.
Similarly, a pharmaceutical patent-holder will file suit in response to a
paragraph IV certification only if it is prepared to follow through on
the litigation. Given this legal regime, both parties will take actions
that will lead to litigation only if the expected value from litigating the
case to completion is positive. Thus, for the pharmaceutical patentholder, V, > 0, and for the generic, V,, > 0. This means that each must
expect to recover from the litigation more than it costs, such that:
RX,,> C

(3)

and
(1-R)X, > C.

(4)179

178. In our initial exploration of these rule regimes, we shall focus on the parties'
decision within the context of a single instance of litigation. We shall explore the
possibility of successive rounds of litigation in Part IV. See infra text accompanying notes
251-55.
179. In other words, both parties will litigate only if it is rational to do so. The patentee
will look at its chance of success, R, and the monopoly profits it expects to continue to
earn if it wins, X, and compare those to the cost of litigation, C. If its expected gain from
litigating, which equals its chance of winning multiplied by the monopoly profits it would
earn from keeping generic competition out of the market, are sufficient to cover the
litigation costs, then it will litigate. If it is certain to lose, perhaps because it knows its
patent is invalid, or if it is not earning monopoly profits in any event, perhaps because of
other competing pharmaceuticals already in the market, then its expected gain from
litigating may not cover its costs. In that case, the patentee would simply allow generic
entry without initiating a lawsuit.
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So long as equations (3) and (4) are satisfied, both parties will
litigate. If equation (3) or (4) is not satisfied, such that the expected
value from litigating is negative for one party or the other, that party
will avoid taking the steps that may lead to litigation. If the generic
estimates its expected return insufficient to cover the expected costs
of litigation, then it will not file a paragraph IV certification with its
ANDA. If the pharmaceutical patent-holder estimates its return as
insufficient to cover its expected costs, then it will not file a lawsuit in
response to a paragraph IV certification.
Thus, a "no-settlement" rule will lead to fewer patent cases being
filed. However, it may not weed out many cases, as it weeds out only
those cases where one party or the other is virtually certain to win.
While the costs of pharmaceutical-patent litigation are high, the
stakes from winning or losing are usually much higher. Using the
figures for the Prozac case, for example, litigation may cost $10
million for each party, but Barr's gain from prevailing in the litigation
was nearly $300 million, and Eli Lilly's loss was over $3 billion.'"
Given what they have to gain or lose, Barr Laboratories needs an
expected chance of success in the lawsuit of only 3.4% to justify filing
a paragraph IV certification. Anything more than a 3.4% chance of
earning the $294.2 million prize from successful litigation will cover
the $10 million that Barr Laboratories expects to spend on the
litigation."' On the other hand, if Barr files a paragraph IV
certification, then to preserve its monopoly, Eli Lilly will file suit so
long as it believes that it has more than a 0.3% chance of winning the
lawsuit. While Eli Lilly might not find the proverbial one-in-a-million
long-shot worth litigating, as long as it has even a slight chance of
winning the litigation, the billions at stake from preserving exclusivity
in the Prozac market will readily cover the estimated $10 million in
litigation costs. Indeed, even if Eli Lilly faced radically higher
litigation costs, say $100 million, rather than $10 million, Eli Lilly
would still file suit in response to a paragraph IV certification so long
as it estimated that it had more than a 3% chance of winning the
lawsuit.
As a result, while it might weed out a few lawsuits involving very
strong or very weak patent infringement claims, a no-settlement rule
would likely reduce the number of pharmaceutical-patent cases filed
only slightly. Given the substantial rents pharmaceutical patents and
the 180-day generic exclusivity offer, it would still make rational
180. See supra notes 169-72.
181. See supra notes 173-75.
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economic sense to file the vast majority of these cases even if both
parties knew that they would have to litigate them to final judgment.
The key difference then, with a no-settlement rule, would be that
more cases would be litigated to final judgment, rather than settle as
they do under the current rules."
Such a rule regime would tend to ensure results consistent with
both patent and antitrust laws. As discussed, the patent regime seeks
to ensure exclusivity in a market so that the resulting financial returns
are sufficient to ensure that a given invention is devised and disclosed.
The antitrust regime seeks to ensure that consumers have to pay the
artificially high prices associated with a patent only to the extent
necessary to ensure that the invention at issue is devised and
disclosed. As long as the patent rules are well designed, such that a
patent-holder's chance of succeeding on a patent-infringement claim
reflects the financial return necessary to achieve an efficient
allocation of inventive resources, then forcing parties to litigate all
pharmaceutical-patent disputes to final judgment would tend to
promote allocative efficiency. Litigation to final judgment would tend
to ensure that patent-holders, on average, received precisely that
inducement sufficient, but no more so, to bring forth desirable
innovation.
Under a no-settlement rule, strong patent claims, by definition,
would prevail, at least on average. For strong patents, prices would
tend to remain high but that would reflect the patent system's
judgment that for these inventions, high prices are appropriate. Weak
patent claims, on the other hand, would on average fail. Prices would
fall but, if the patent system is well-designed, not in ways that would
discourage desirable innovations. Of course, as in any human system,
mistakes would be made. Infringement claims that should succeed
would sometimes fail; claims that should fail would sometimes
succeed. Yet, so long as no one mistakenly bankrupted the associated
182. In a 2002 study, the FTC identified 104 first-filer ANDAs with paragraph IV
certifications that brand-name pharmaceutical companies received between January 1,
1992, and January 1, 2001. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO

PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 15 (2002). In response to these certifications, the
brand-name pharmaceutical company sued the ANDA filers for patent infringement in
seventy-five instances. Id. Of the seventy-five lawsuits, fifty-three had been resolved by
the time of the study. In two of these fifty-three, the patent had expired before the lawsuit
was resolved, and the cases were consequently dismissed. Id. In another, the NDA was
withdrawn before the litigation was resolved, and again the case was dismissed. Id. Of the
remaining fifty, twenty had been settled, while thirty were resolved by judicial decision. Id.
Of the thirty judicial decisions, the generic applicant won in twenty-two. Id. Thus, rather
than the observed 40% settlement rate (twenty out of fifty cases) in this sample, a nosettlement rule would have had a 0% settlement rate.
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plaintiff, the mistakes should average out. If they do not, then that
suggests a problem with the patent rules that should be addressed
directly, rather than through the rules regarding settlement.18 1
While a no-settlement rule thus promotes the policies of both
patent and antitrust law, such a rule faces familiar objections. These
include: (i) it would force parties to litigate when they would rather
not, a troubling result particularly where a party's change of heart is
due to information newly acquired during the litigation; (ii) it would
be expensive and would require parties to spend resources on
litigation, rather than on more productive uses elsewhere; and (iii) it
would tie down scarce judicial resources to patent litigation that again
might be better used elsewhere.'" So far, courts have shown little
inclination to adopt a no-settlement rule."ss Even the Actavis Court
recognized the value of settlements to resolve complex, uncertain,
and expensive litigation.8 6 Nevertheless, the no-settlement rule has
several advantages. While it forces parties to litigate, so long as the
rule was clear at the outset, the litigation does not provide many
grounds for complaint. Similarly, while the rule forces parties and
courts to expend time and resources on patent litigation, the costs of
such litigation are a very small fraction of the value of getting these
cases resolved correctly. Most importantly, it allows the patent system
to do its job. It allows the patent system to provide weak patent
protection for easy inventions, and strong patent protection for hard
inventions. It thus allows the patent system to promote an efficient
allocation of available resources. It also ensures that prices in patentprotected markets are no higher than necessary to bring forth
desirable innovation. A no-settlement rule thus promotes the
purposes of both the patent and antitrust laws.

183. Moreover, settlement will reflect the parties' expectations as to how the lawsuit
will come out. Even if the legal rules are poorly tailored to the purposes of patent law, the
parties' settlement will reflect that same poor tailoring.
184. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005).
185. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2006)
(" 'Where a case is complex and expensive, and resolution of the case will benefit the
public, the public has a strong interest in settlement.' " (quoting United States v. Glens
Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 856-57 (2d Cir. 1998))); Schering-Plough Corp., 402
F.3d at 1075 ("There is no question that settlements provide a number of private and
social benefits as opposed to the inveterate and costly effects of litigation.").
186. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013) ("The Eleventh Circuit's
conclusion finds some degree of support in a general legal policy favoring the settlement
of disputes.").
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.2. Settlement Rule Regime #2: Reverse Payments Allowed
In contrast, as we shall see, the second rule regime promotes
neither purpose. Following the "scope of the patent" approach, the
second settlement rule regime generally immunizes reverse payment
settlements from antitrust attack. The settlement of a pharmaceutical
patent lawsuit would open the door to antitrust liability in only three
circumstances: (i) the settlement extends the exclusionary right
beyond the scope or duration of the patent(s) at issue; (ii) the patent
at issue was acquired through fraud on the PTO; or (iii) the claims of
patent infringement were "objectively baseless."' Under this rule
regime, a settlement would not subject the parties to antitrust liability
even if the amount of the reverse payment exceeded the generic
company's expected profit from winning the lawsuit. Again, as for the
other settlement rule regimes, we will assume that the parties will
settle if they can find settlements terms, permissible under this rule
regime, that makes each party better off settling than it would be
litigating.
When we open up the settlement options under this rule regime,
we find two differences from the first regime. While I will discuss
these differences in more detail, these two differences are: First,
generics will pursue invalidity or non-infringement claims, even those
they are very likely to lose, in an effort to extort reverse payment
settlements from the pharmaceutical patent-holder. Second, so long
as the two sides share a similar sense for the pharmaceutical patentholder's chance of success in the litigation, every case will settle. In
every case, the generic will agree to remain out of the market until
the patent expires; only the amount of the payment will vary.
With respect to the first difference, generic companies will file
paragraph IV certifications even where they are nearly certain to lose
in order to extract a reverse payment settlement from the
pharmaceutical patent-holder. As we have seen, where the generic is
nearly certain to lose, pursuing litigation to secure generic entry can
be a money-losing proposition for the generic firm. In the Prozac
example, Barr Laboratories would expect to lose money if it
estimated its chance of winning the lawsuit at less than 3.4%. Under
the first rule regime, for such cases, the generic will avoid filing a
paragraph IV certification. In contrast, if reverse payments are lawful,
187. See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312, rev'd sub nom. FTC v.
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.,
544 F.3d 1323, 1333-36 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 557 U.S. 920 (2009); In re Tarnoxifen,
466 F.3d at 212-13.
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a generic company may bring a lawsuit in such a case in order to
extract a payment from the pharmaceutical patent-holder.
For any given chance of success, the pharmaceutical patentholder will always have more at stake than the generic.188 As a result,
even a slight chance that the generic may succeed on its claims can
confront the pharmaceutical patent-holder with a substantial riskone that the pharmaceutical patent-holder would be willing to pay to
resolve in its favor. Using the numbers from the Prozac example, and
assuming that both parties believe that Eli Lilly's claims of patent
infringement are very strong, such that Eli Lilly has a 98% chance of
success, Barr Laboratories would expect to lose $4.12 million if it
were to litigate the case.189 It has only a 2% chance of securing early
entry into the market and would have to spend $10 million on
litigation to secure that chance. Under a regime prohibiting
settlement, Barr would not file a paragraph IV certification in such a
case. Yet, if reverse payments are lawful, it might pursue such a
paragraph IV certification. While it expects to lose money if it has to
litigate to final judgment, Barr Laboratories knows that the expected
loss to Eli Lilly from litigation would be even larger. Eli Lilly would
face its own $10 million in litigation costs, and while the risk of losing
is very small, even a 2% chance of losing over $3 billion is a very large
number. As a result, there is a possibility that Eli Lilly would pay Barr
to settle the litigation and avoid any risk of losing its exclusivity.
While we cannot be sure what terms the parties would finally
agree to in such a case, we can define the range of settlements that
both parties would prefer to the alternative of litigating such a case to
final judgment. If both parties estimated Barr's chance of success at
2%, Barr Laboratories would be willing to settle by agreeing to
remain out of the market until the patent(s) at issue expired and
would be willing to pay Eli Lilly up to $4.12 million (its expected loss)
to do so. Eli Lilly, on the other hand, would be willing to settle if Barr
agreed to remain out of the market until the patent(s) at issue expired
and would be willing to pay Barr $75.8 million to do so. As a matter
of economic theory, we cannot confidently predict who would pay
whom or how much." It is possible that Barr would pay Eli Lilly a
188. The patentee is fighting for monopoly profits for the patent's remaining duration,
while the generic is, at best, fighting for duopoly profits for a 180-day period, followed by
competitive returns.
189. 1 am using in this calculation the higher stake for Barr of $287.4 million. If we use
the lower stake of $81.4 million, then Barr would expect to lose $8.4 million by litigating
rather than settling and delaying its 180-day generic exclusivity by thirty-four months.
190. Of course, we could throw around terms such as bargaining power and reputation,
but those are just different ways of saying we do not know.
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sum of up to $4.12 million to settle the case; it is just as possible that
Eli Lilly would pay Barr a sum of up to $75.8 million to settle the
case. While we do not know who will pay whom, or how much, we do
know that the parties will settle and that Barr will agree to remain out
of the market until the patents at issue expire. Nevertheless, the
possibility that a generic could extract a payment from the
pharmaceutical patent-holder in such a case, where the generic is so
certain to lose that it expects to lose money on the litigation, provides
the generic with an incentive to file a paragraph IV certification
against even very strong patents. While more paragraph IV
certifications will be filed, they will not be filed to prevail in litigation.
Rather, generics under this rule regime will file a paragraph IV
certification against very strong patents to extort a payment from the
pharmaceutical patent-holder. The incentive to file such extortionate
claims is not present under the no-settlement rule.
With respect to the second difference, we should expect every
pharmaceutical patent case to settle when reverse payments are
presumptively lawful. This stands in contrast to the first rule regime,
where only a very few cases settle, and the vast majority are litigated
to final judgment. When reverse payments are presumptively lawful,
the parties can always find some reverse payment, P, that the
pharmaceutical patent-holder can offer the generic company to
remain out of the market that will make both parties better off
settling, rather than litigating.'
As a general rule, a generic company will accept the offer of a
payment, P, and agree to remain out of the market until the patent
expires if the expected value from settling, S, equals or exceeds its
expected value from litigating, V,,, or:
SI) = P > V, = (1-R)X,) - C.

(5)

Similarly, the pharmaceutical patent-holder will be willing to
offer a payment, P, in return for the generic company's agreement to
remain out of the market until the patent expires, if the expected
value from settling exceeds its expected value from litigating. The
expected value from settling on these terms is the expected profit
from exclusivity, less the agreed payment, or:
S, = X, - P.

(6)

191. At this point, we are assuming that there is only one generic form. We will
examine the case where there may be multiple potential generic entrants in a later section.
See infra text accompanying notes 247-49.
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the

pharmaceutical patent-holder would be better off settling than it
would be litigating. Substituting in for S,, and V, and simplifying the
equation, we can define the payment that a pharmaceutical patentholder would be willing to offer a generic to maintain exclusivity as:
P:5(1-R)X, + C.

(7)

A reverse payment, P, exists that will make both parties better
off settling, rather than litigating, if both equation (5) and equation
(7) are satisfied, such that:
(1-R) XP + C

PE (1-R)X, - C.

(8)

So long as X,, > X,, there will be some reverse payment, P, that
will satisfy equation (8). Given that the pharmaceutical patent-holder
will always have more at stake than the generic, we should expect X,,
> X,, and as a result, there will always be some reverse payment that
will satisfy equation (8). As a result, no matter what value the parties
place on the pharmaceutical patent-holder's chance of success, so
long as they agree on that value, there will be some reverse payment
that will make both parties better off settling and having the generic
remain out of the market, rather than litigating.
Moreover, both parties would be better off with a reverse
payment settlement that bars generic entry for the full patent term
even in those cases where the patent-holder is so certain to lose that
the patent-holder would not even bother to file suit at all under the
first rule regime. Once we open the door to reverse payment
settlements, the pharmaceutical patent-holder will always sue, and we
should expect the parties to settle in a manner that prohibits generic
entry in return for a reverse payment to the generic company. So long
as the rents available with patent protection exceed those available
without, the parties will always be better off maximizing their joint
profit by maintaining the patent and then splitting the profits in an
appropriate manner than they would be allowing generic entry at any
point before the patent expires.
In the Prozac example, even if both parties knew that the patent
would be invalidated, they could both be made better off by leaving
the patent in place and splitting the $3.29 billion in associated rents,
than they would be under any possible settlement that allowed
generic entry. Now, it may be in such a case that the "sham" litigation
exception would effectively bring such an agreement within the ambit
of the antitrust laws. But the "sham" exception would do so only in
those extremely rare instances where it is perfectly clear to everyone
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that the patent infringement claims were objectively baseless.'" If the
claims of patent infringement were merely extremely weak, rather
than completely without merit, the sham litigation exception would
not apply. As a result, under the second settlement rule regime, we
should expect parties to settle and maintain patents that would
otherwise have been struck down.
Compared to a no-settlement rule, a regime allowing reverse
payment settlements advances neither the goals of the antitrust laws
nor the goals of the patent laws. That it fails to advance the goals of
the antitrust laws is relatively clear. With such settlements, parties can
insulate even extremely weak pharmaceutical patents from challenge.
Consumers continue to pay high prices for certain pharmaceuticals
where, but for the settlement, the patent would have been struck
down and generic entry would have led to sharply lower prices.
What has so far gone unrecognized is that this laissez-faire
approach to pharmaceutical-patent settlements also disserves the
goals of the patent system. As discussed, the goal of the patent system
is not to provide the maximum possible reward for every invention.' 3
Rather, it is to ensure an appropriate reward-one that tends to
ensure that available resources are devoted to their highest valued
use. A strong patent reflects the patent system's judgment that the
invention at issue needs a correspondingly high reward to ensure that
inventive resources are allocated efficiently. A weak patent reflects
the patent system's judgment that the invention at issue needs a
correspondingly low reward to ensure that inventive resources are

allocated efficiently.194
Allowing reverse payment settlements would allow parties to
distort the functioning of the patent system and frustrate its purpose.
The patent system intentionally provides a low reward to weak
pharmaceutical patents. Yet, if we allow reverse payment settlements,
the parties could settle, insulate the weak patent from attack, and
could thereby enable minor and trivially easy advances in
pharmaceuticals to receive disproportionately high rewards. Such a
result would lead to inefficiency.' For weak pharmaceutical patents,
192. See Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1312 n.10 ("Although the FTC's complaint
alleges that Solvay was 'not likely to prevail' . . . it does not contend .. . that there was no

objective basis to believe the patent was valid and infringed. Accordingly, we do not rule
out the possibility that sufficient allegations of any of those facts would state a valid
antitrust claim.").
193. See supra Part lIl.A.
194. See Lunney, supra note 158, at 39-56, 68-70.
195. The payment made to the generic drug company will tend to reduce, but not
eliminate, the excessive returns that the reverse payment settlement option makes
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such a settlement would allow the parties to substitute their own
selfish desires for a high reward for the patent system's judgment that
only a low reward was appropriate. By ensuring such a high reward,
inventive resources devoted to easy pharmaceutical research would
earn a disproportionately high price, and that high price, in turn,
would attract additional inventive resources into easy pharmaceutical
research even when those resources could have been used more
valuably elsewhere.
This is not merely a theoretical concern. Pharmaceutical
companies divert millions of dollars that could have been spent
developing new, potentially life-saving medications into developing,
patenting, and marketing slight modifications to existing
pharmaceutical formulations."' They spend these resources to ensure
that, when their patents on the original formulations expire, they can
switch physicians to the new and newly patented formulation and
limit the impact of generic competition.'97 Rather than create new
value, they spend time and resources in order to capture value that
already exists. While reverse payment settlements are not the sole
cause of this so-called "evergreening" phenomenon,' 98 by maximizing
the rents that weak patents can capture, allowing reverse payment
settlements would only encourage this type of wasteful rent-seeking.
In short, allowing reverse payment settlements certainly satisfies
the interests of the litigants. Through their use, the litigants can settle
every pharmaceutical patent case, ensure that every pharmaceutical
patent remains in force, and share the resulting rents between
themselves. Yet, allowing such settlements disserves the purposes of
both the patent and antitrust laws.

available to pharmaceutical research. The payment will also tend to encourage investment
in filing ANDAs with paragraph IV certifications, rather than research into desirable
innovation.
196. For discussions of this phenomenon, see Haiden A. Huskamp et al., Generic
Entry, Reformulations and Promotion of SSRls, 26 PHARMACOECONOMICS 603, 604

(2008); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Biomedical Patents and the Public's Health:
Is There a Role for Eminent Domain?, 295 JAMA 434,435 (2006).
197. In Actavis itself, the generics agreed to remain out of the market until August 31,
2015. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013). This was sixty-five months before
the patent at issue expired. Id. But it was the year Solvay "anticipated shifting its
customers to a new product with no generic equivalent." FTC Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 7, at 6.
198. Evergreening is the practice of obtaining new patents on minor variations of, or
improvements to, an existing pharmaceutical, principally to extend a manufacturer's
claims of patent protection indefinitely. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DRUG
PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984, at 99 (Allan M.

Fox & Alan R. Bennett eds., 1987).
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3. Settlement Rule Regime #3: No Reverse Payments; Vary Timing
of Patent Invalidity and Generic Entry
So far, we have explored two settlement rule regimes. The first
achieves the dual goals of the patent and antitrust laws but at the
expense of forcing parties to litigate to final judgment
pharmaceutical-patent litigation. The second regime readily allows
the parties to settle as they see fit, but at the expense of sacrificing the
goals of both the patent and antitrust laws. In Actavis, the Court
suggested another possibility that may address all of these concerns.
Specifically, the Court explained that parties to Hatch-Waxman
pharmaceutical-patent litigation can settle "by allowing the generic
manufacturer to enter the patentee's market prior to the patent's
expiration, without the patentee paying the challenger to stay out
prior to that point."' 9 In this section, we explore the Court's
suggestion and examine a settlement rule regime that allows the
parties to agree as to the time at which the patent will become invalid
and generic entry will occur,2" but prohibits side payments in either
direction. To be perfectly clear, we are not talking about licensed
generic entry under this rule regime. Rather, under this rule regime,
the settlement specifies a time at which the patent(s) at issue become
invalid or otherwise unenforceable and unlicensed generic entry
begins. That time must fall between the end of the litigation and the
patent's expiration. When the agreed time arrives, the settling generic
manufacturer enters with its own generic and receives its 180-day
generic exclusivity. Immediately afterwards, general generic entry
then follows.
Under this regime, the key negotiating point for the parties is the
time at which the patent will become invalid and generic entry will
begin. It can be immediately; it can wait until the patent's term
expires; or it can fall anywhere in between. Depending on the time for
entry to which the parties agree, such a settlement will allocate a
199. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
200. In its decision, the Court does not state directly that the parties will agree in the
settlement that the patent will become invalid or otherwise unenforceable against all
generics. Id. The Court instead writes that the parties "may, as in other industries, settle in
other ways, for example, by allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the patentee's
market prior to the patent's expiration, without the patentee paying the challenger to stay
out prior to that point." Id. In this analysis, I am assuming that generic entry occurs
generally at the agreed time. If, instead, the settlement agreement allows only one generic
entry, then the economics are different from those presented under the analysis of
settlement rule regime #4. They will look more like the economics that I will analyze in
connection with licensed generic entry in the next section. See infra text accompanying
notes 238-56.
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corresponding fraction, *(t), of the net present value of the expected
exclusion rents to the pharmaceutical patent-holder. The generic, on
the other hand, will receive the same rents that it would capture from
winning the litigation but discounted by a factor, (t), to reflect that
entry will be delayed until the agreed time. Again, the parties will
settle if they can find a time for generic entry to begin, which makes
both parties better off settling, rather than litigating.
The pharmaceutical patent-holder will be better off settling
rather than litigating so long as the time selected for generic entry
leaves it a sufficient fraction of the available exclusion rents, such
that:
0(t)*X, > RX, - C.

(9)

The trade off under this settlement approach is that the patentholder is entitled to prevent generic entry and earn its resulting
monopoly profits, but only for some part of the patent's remaining
life, rather than face the all-or-nothing uncertainty of litigation. When
we simplify equation (9), we find that the pharmaceutical patentholder will agree to settle so long as:
(t)

R - C/(X,).

(10)

Thus, the minimum time for entry that the pharmaceutical
patent-holder would accept reflects fairly directly the parties' shared
estimate of the patent-holder's chance of success, less that fraction of
the exclusivity rents that the patent-holder expects to spend on the
litigation.
The generic company, on the other hand, would be better off
settling rather than litigating so long as the net present value of its
expected profits from entry at the agreed time leaves it a discounted
fraction of the available generic entry rents, such that:
6(t) *X,, > (1-R)X,,- C.

(11)

While we could similarly solve equation (11) to define the range
of settlements acceptable to the generic in terms of the discount
factor, 0(t), we cannot compare the results directly because the
patent-holder's fraction, 0(t), and the generic's discount factor, 6(t),
are different, non-linear functions of the agreed time for entry.
If we examine the issue empirically instead, we find that the
suggested settlement format will generally leave a range of possible
times for entry that both parties would prefer to litigating. We can
illustrate using the numbers from the Prozac example. If we assume
that both parties estimate Eli Lilly's chance of success as fifty-fifty, Eli
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Lilly would be better off settling and allowing generic entry to begin
so long as the net present value of its expected rents under the
settlement exceed its expected value from litigating, or $1.635 billion.
Similarly, Barr Laboratories would be better off settling and being
allowed entry so long as the net present value of its expected rents
under the settlement exceeds its expected value from litigating, or
$137.1 million. Compared to litigating, Eli Lilly would be better off
settling so long as it obtains at least sixteen months of market
exclusivity.20 ' With sixteen months of market exclusivity and a
discount rate of 10%, the net present value of the expected rents from
the settlement for Eli Lilly would be $1.654 billion. So long as Barr
agreed to wait at least sixteen months before entering, Eli Lilly would
be better off settling rather than litigating.
As it turns out, Barr would be better off settling and being
allowed to enter at any time of entry that would allow it to keep its
180-day generic exclusivity. 2" Even if Barr agreed to wait for twentyeight months before entering, it would still receive a discounted
present value from the expected rents of $226.4 million. This is far
more than Barr expects to receive should it litigate. The reason for
this disparity is simple: While settling forces Barr to wait for its
money, settling makes the money guaranteed, by eliminating the risk
that Barr might lose the litigation and thereby lose the 180-day
generic exclusivity rents altogether. Indeed, Barr would be better off
settling even if it had to wait thirty months to enter. While waiting
thirty months to enter would cost Barr two months of its 180-day
generic exclusivity, the guaranteed rents from just four months of
generic exclusivity, thirty months in the future, would still be worth

201. Note that in this example, sixteen months are less than half of the thirty-four
months at issue. The fraction * is not the fraction of the time left on the patent, however.
Rather, it is the fraction of the net present value of the expected rents. Given a positive
discount rate, money earned sooner is worth more than money earned later. As a result,
even though sixteen months represents only 47% of the time remaining on the patents, it
represents 50.6% of the discounted present value of the expected rents.
202. Under the current forfeiture rules, Barr could keep the 180-day exclusivity if it
settled and entered the market one day before Eli Lilly's last patent expired. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(VI) (2012). Moreover, the 180-day exclusivity period itself ends when
the last patent would otherwise expire. See Mylan Labs. Inc. v. Leavitt, 484 F. Supp. 2d
109, 122-23 (D.D.C. 2007); David E. Korn, Erika Lietzan & Shaw W. Scott, A New
History and Discussion of 180-Day Exclusivity, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 335, 363-65 (2009).
Therefore, as a practical matter, to keep the full 180 days, Barr would have to enter six
months before the term of the patent at issue would otherwise expire.
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$148.2 million. 203 Such a settlement would still leave Barr better off
than its expected return from litigating.
This leaves us with a range of terms that both parties would
prefer to litigating. In a fifty-fifty case, Eli Lilly would be willing to
settle so long as the parties agreed to delay entry at least sixteen
months. Barr would be willing to settle so long as the parties agreed
that entry was delayed not more than thirty months. Thus, both
parties would be better off settling, rather than litigating, by agreeing
to allow a delay of more than sixteen months but less than thirty
months. Where within this range the parties will actually settle, we
cannot predict.
We can extend this analysis more generally, and can calculate the
range of entry dates that the parties would prefer compared to
litigating, for different chances of success, R. To illustrate, Table 2
presents, for the thirty-four months remaining on the patents at issue,
the shortest delay for generic entry that Eli Lilly would be willing to
accept and the longest delay that Barr would be willing to accept for:
(i) a strong patent, R=80%; (ii) a medium patent, R=50%; and (iii) a
weak patent, R=20%.
Table 2
Acceptable Range of Entry Times as a Function of Eli Lilly's
Chance of Success
R
80%
50%
20%

Earliest Acceptable Entry
27 mos.
16 mos.
7 mos.

Latest Acceptable Entry
32 mos.
30 mos.
27 mos.

While not perfect, a variable time approach to settlement offers
two advantages compared to our first two rule regimes. First, it leaves
parties a viable avenue for settling most pharmaceutical patent cases
and thus avoids the disadvantage of a no-settlement regime. Second,
it also tends to promote the purposes of both the patent and antitrust
laws and thus avoids the disadvantages of the scope of the patent
settlement regime.

203. 1 calculated this number by calculating the per-month profit for the six-month
exclusivity period, based upon Barr's reported earnings. Using a 10% annual discount
rate, I then determined the present value of four months worth of such profits, beginning
thirty months in the future.
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This structure serves the purposes of the patent and antitrust
laws because, as Table 2 reflects, the parties will settle by agreeing to
a term of entry that reflects the pharmaceutical patent-holder's
chance of success, R. For stronger patents, with a better chance of
success in litigation, the parties will agree to delay entry somewhat
longer. For weaker patents, with a lower chance of success, the parties
will move the entry date forward. But, in both cases, such an
approach is fully appropriate. To the extent that the chance of
success, R, reflects the patent system's judgment regarding the level
of protection and consequently the reward that a given patented
invention deserves, tying the timing of entry to the chance of success
directly preserves the patent system's judgment. Similarly, from the
antitrust perspective, generic entry and lower prices will come sooner
for consumers when the litigation involves a weak patent and will
come later when the litigation involves a strong patent. While there is
a difference between such an approach and litigating every patent to
final judgment,2 0 such an approach should tend to protect consumers
from unjustifiably high prices for patented pharmaceuticals. Under
this approach, for weaker patents, consumers will pay the high patentprotected prices but for a shorter period. For stronger patents,
consumers will pay the higher prices for a longer period, perhaps even
the full patent term. But, in each case, the duration of the high prices
would reflect the strength of the patent and hence the judgment of
the patent system as to the justifiable period for prices to remain high.
The variable-time-of-entry settlement format is not perfect,
however. To achieve the purposes of the patent and antitrust laws as
effectively as the no-settlement rule, the parties would have to agree
to a time for entry such that:
95(t)

= R.

(12)

While it is possible that the parties will agree to such a time for
entry, it is not inevitable. If the generic challenger is an effective and
204. The difference is that with the settlement approach all of the patents will prohibit
entry for some time period. It will be shorter for weaker patents, but there will still be
some delay. In contrast, if each patent were litigated to final judgment, many of the
weaker patents would be struck down entirely, allowing immediate (or at least postjudgment) entry. Yet, under the litigation approach, some weak patents would survive. It
might only be one in ten, but that one would remain valid for its full term. From a
consumer welfare perspective, neither approach offers a clear advantage. Whether
consumers would be better off by having nine weak patents struck down immediately,
while one lingers for its full term, or having all ten weak patents enforced but only for a
short time period is impossible to predict. But there is no reason to think that one
approach is clearly better than the other.
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skillful negotiator, it may be able to push the pharmaceutical patentholder to accept a settlement with a time for entry close to the earliest
time for entry that the patent-holder would accept rather than litigate.
In that case, the time for entry might well approximate the optimality
condition set forth in equation (12). On the other hand, if the generic
challenger is not an effective and skillful negotiator, the
pharmaceutical patent-holder may be able to push the generic to
accept a settlement with a time for entry close to the latest time for
entry that the generic would prefer to litigating. In that case, the
Hatch-Waxman Act, as presently structured, will not prove very
effective at policing weak patents.
Thus, the extent to which a variable-time-of-entry settlement will
advance the goals of the patent and antitrust laws will depend entirely
on the relative skill of the generic challenger in negotiating an early
time of entry. While there is a possibility that the generic may settle
readily, for whatever it can get, in the absence of a reverse payment,
its only financial benefit from settling comes from entering as soon as
possible. Therefore, it has every reason to push for the earliest
possible generic entry. While we cannot be certain where the parties
will settle within the range of times for generic entry that make both
parties better off settling, at least under this settlement format, the
generic's private interests tend to align with the interests of
consumers and the public interest more generally.
D. Complications: Treating the Symptoms, Not the Disease
This analysis suggests that, given the options available to it, the
Supreme Court got the issue exactly right. By creating a substantial
risk of antitrust liability for reverse payment settlements, it made such
settlements less likely and thereby advanced the goals of both the
patent and antitrust laws. It served the goals of the patent system by
preventing private parties from circumventing the rules of the patent
system in order to capture inappropriately high returns on easy
inventions. It served the goals of the antitrust laws by preventing
private parties from entering into agreements that would force
consumers to pay unjustifiably high prices for patented
pharmaceuticals. At the same time, the Court left the parties a
perfectly viable avenue for settling pharmaceutical patent disputes
informally and so upheld the longstanding judicial support for
settlements-for whatever that is worth.
Before we applaud too loudly and move on, however, there is
one small problem with the Court's resolution. It treats a symptom
but does not cure the underlying disease. The disease here is that

2015]

PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION

427

even relatively weak pharmaceutical patents can generate
disproportionately large rents. Finding a way to insulate such weak
patents from attack ensures that those rents will continue to flow,
leaving the parties free to split them as they see fit. In the Prozac
example, if Eli Lilly and Barr Laboratories could have found
settlement terms that did not run afoul of the antitrust laws, while
leaving Eli Lilly's patents intact, they could have split $3.29 billion.
Even a small share of that is more than the $300 million that Barr
expected to earn from entering the market, even with 180-day generic
exclusivity. $3 billion will also pay for a lot of creative thinking on
how to capture the rents available from preserving weak
pharmaceutical patents without running afoul of the Court's holding
in Actavis. Certainly, we should not expect pharmaceutical patentholders and generics simply to walk away from that money and let it
return to consumers through lower prices just because the Court said
to do so.
In its opinion, the Court left two possible avenues open for
settlements that may preserve weak pharmaceutical patents and their
associated rents, yet not run afoul of the antitrust laws. First, as part
of the rule-of-reason analysis it adopted, the Court left room for the
pharmaceutical patent-holder to prove that a reverse payment had
"offsetting or redeeming virtues."205 As the Court explained, such a
payment "may amount to no more than a rough approximation of the
litigation expenses saved through the settlement."2 06 Or it "may
reflect compensation for other-services that the generic has promised
to perform-such as distributing the patented item or helping to
develop a market for that item."207 While policing the line between
205. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. It is also not clear if the Court intended to leave open
other procompetitive possibilities. The dissent, for example, suggested that the
pharmaceutical patent-holder "will want to use the validity of his patent as a defense" in a
rule-of-reason antitrust lawsuit. Id. at 2244 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Can a defendant
argue that it settled to preserve a patent that was necessary to bring forth a life-saving
pharmaceutical as a procompetitive benefit of the settlement? The Court seems to suggest
that a defendant cannot, but it is not altogether clear. Id. at 2237 ("To say this is not to
require the courts to insist ... that the Commission need litigate the patent's validity, [or]
empirically demonstrate the virtues or vices of the patent system."). In its decision
adopting a quick-look approach, the Third Circuit suggested that a reverse payment
settlement might entail a procompetitive benefit when it "enables a cash-starved generic
manufacturer to avoid bankruptcy and begin marketing a generic drug." In re K-Dur
Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012). We should be careful before adopting
such a position, however. Else, we will end up with thinly capitalized generics specifically
established to pursue just one case so that the avoid-bankruptcy argument would always
be available.
206. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
207. Id.
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compensation for litigation expenses saved and a sharing of patent
rents to preserve a weak patent seems reasonably straightforward,
policing the line between compensation for other services and the
sharing of patent rents is likely to prove far more difficult.
On remand in Actavis, these difficulties will likely take center
stage. In the agreements before the Court in Actavis, each of the
generics had agreed to promote the patented pharmaceutical to
doctors.208 In its complaint, the FTC alleged that these other services
had little value and that the "true point of the payments was to
compensate the generics for agreeing not to compete against
AndroGel until 2 0 1 5 ."209 Because the case came to the Court on a

motion to dismiss, the Court could resolve this dispute readily.
Following the rules that govern motions to dismiss, the Court simply
accepted as true the pleadings of the complaint. The specific
procedural context of Actavis thus made resolving the dispute trivially
easy. On remand, however, determining the real reason for a
particular payment may prove a far more difficult issue to resolve.
Moreover, as we move forward, we should expect that issue to
become even more difficult as parties adapt to the Actavis rules and
become more creative in crafting "compensation for other services"

covers.210
The second avenue the Court left open is more fundamentally
troubling, however. Rather than pay a generic to remain out of the
market, the pharmaceutical patent-holder could settle these patent
disputes by agreeing to license the generic defendant's entry into the
market, while using licensing terms that serve to maintain the patentholder's profit-maximizing price. 2 11 While a traditional percentage-ofrevenue royalty license would leave the generic with an incentive to
cheat and sell the generic drug at a lower price in order to maximize
its own profits, the patent-holder can discourage such cheating by: (i)
setting an appropriate per-dose license fee, so that the license fee plus
208. Id. at 2229 ("Actavis also agreed to promote AndroGel to urologists.").
209. Id.
210. FTC Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 6. The FTC alleged that the
settlements in Actavis itself entailed the use of such cover stories. Id. Because of the
uncertain legality of reverse payment settlements in 2006 (when the parties settled in the
case), the settlement agreement between Solvay and Actavis required Actavis to market
Androgel to urologists. Id. Similarly, the settlement agreements with Paddock and Par
required Paddock to serve as a back-up supplier of Androgel and Par to market Androgel
to primary-care physicians. Id. By agreeing to these roles, Solvay and the generics can
contend on remand that the payments were not merely for delayed entry, but they were
for these other services.
211. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Comment, Atari v. Nintendo: Does a Closed
System Violate the Antitrust Laws?, 5 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 29,40 (1990).
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the marginal cost of the drug equals the drug's profit-maximizing
price; (ii) restricting the quantity of the generic drug that the licensee
may sell; or (iii) setting a minimum resale price for the generic drug in
the license.212 Using any of these three approaches would enable the
patent-holder to discourage cheating by the licensee and preserve the
patent's associated monopoly profits. Just as in the reverse payment
settlement, the resulting rents could then be split between the
pharmaceutical patent-holder and its generic licensee in whatever
manner ensured that both would be better off with the license
agreement than they would be litigating.2 13 Entry would occurindeed, the patent-holder could readily license more than one generic
to enter using this approach-but competition would not.
The Actavis Court seemed to leave this path open. It expressly
conceded that it had previously upheld a patent license agreement in
which the patent-holder specified a minimum resale price in United
General Electric Co.2 14 The Actavis Court further
acknowledged that in United States v. Line Material Co.,215 it had
States v.

"presume[d] that the single-patentee practice approved in General
Electric was a 'reasonable restraint' that 'accords with the patent
monopoly granted by the patent law.' "216 The Court did cite several
cases in which it had found antitrust violations when multiple patentholders attempted to set prices through cross-licenses.2 17 Yet, in the
context of Hatch-Waxman pharmaceutical-patent cases, there is
typically only one patent-holder. And the Court seemed to leave

212. The patent-holder could achieve the same result with a license that contained
limits on the quantities that the generic could manufacture and sell, or by setting the retail
price that the generic must charge as a term of the license.
213. Carl Shapiro has identified a number of other structures that parties might use to
accomplish an anticompetitive settlement of patent litigation. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust
Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 394 (2003) (suggesting
anticompetitive structures, including a merger where the purchase price reflects the
desired rent division, a reverse payment settlement, a joint venture, and a per unit
royalty).
214. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2232 ("We concede that in United States v. General Electric
Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489, 47 S.Ct. 192, 71 L.Ed. 362 (1926), the Court permitted a single
patentee to grant to a single licensee a license containing a minimum resale price
requirement.").
215. 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
216. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2232 (quoting Line Material Co., 333 U.S. at 312).
217. Id. (citing United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 378 (1952); Line
Material Co., 333 U.S. at 310-11; and Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S.
163 (1931)).
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intact the right of a single patent-holder to license its patent(s) on
such terms as it sees fit.2"
Resolving pharmaceutical-patent litigation through such a license
agreement was not common so long as reverse payment settlements
were legal. Compared to the licensing alternative, a reverse payment
settlement offered several advantages. First, allowing entry, even
licensed entry, may change the market in ways that are largely
unforeseeable and difficult to predict. Because of those complexities,
getting the right license terms so that both parties prefer the
settlement to litigation may prove difficult. A one-time reverse
payment is simpler and cleaner from both parties' perspectives and
therefore likely to prove easier to negotiate. Second, at least
historically, reverse payment settlements could create a bottleneck
when used in combination with the 180-day generic exclusivity period,
while allowing entry under a per-dose license may not.219 Third,
reverse payment settlements are better at preserving evergreening
options. 20 So long as there has been no entry, the pharmaceutical

218. Indeed, the Court upheld such a vertical price fixing agreement in General Electric
Co., even though at that time, vertical price fixing was otherwise a per se antitrust
violation. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 409 (1911). In
2007, the Court reversed this per se rule and held that vertical price fixing would be
evaluated under the rule of reason. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877, 877 (2007).
219. It may be possible even under today's forfeiture rules for the first generic
applicant to make a licensed entry, yet neither forfeit nor begin the start of the 180-day
generic-exclusivity period. In dicta, Judge Sack suggested that licensed entry did not begin
the generic-exclusivity period. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 196
(2d Cir. 2006) ("The FDA's action effectively delayed the marketing of other generic
versions of tamoxifen unless and until Barr triggered and exhausted its 180-day exclusivity
period by selling its own generic form of the drug, rather than the version manufactured
by Zeneca. As noted, Barr had little incentive to do so because it was already distributing
Zeneca's version of tamoxifen."). If Judge Sack's dictum is accurate, then a licensed-entry
settlement effectively creates a bottleneck prohibiting the FDA from approving other
generics until the patents at issue expire. While other generics might file paragraph IV
certifications, the pharmaceutical patent-holder can simply refuse to file suit in response,
leaving subsequent generics with no effective means to litigate the patent issues. See
Torpharm, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ. 03-990-SLR, 2004 WL 1465756, at *8-12 (D. Del.
2004). However, the FDA has rejected Judge Sack's dicta and ruled that a generic's entry,
whether with a licensed generic version manufactured by the patent-holder or with its own
generic version, begins the 180-day exclusivity period. See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v.
Thompson, 207 F. Supp. 2d 476, 488 (N.D. W. Va. 2001) (upholding ruling of the FDA
that the 180-day exclusivity period begins when the generic begins marketing its own
generic version or the pharmaceutical patent-holder's generic version of the medication at
issue).
220. For example, in the Actavis litigation itself, the generics agreed to remain out of
the market until August 31, 2015. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229. This was sixty-five months
before the patent at issue expired. Id. But it was the year Solvay "anticipated shifting its
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patent-holder has more leeway to product hop, to shift consumers to
a new, and newly patented, formulation of the pharmaceutical at
issue, and to use other ways to extend its exclusivity in a
pharmaceutical market.
While these concerns may help explain the preference for
reverse payment settlements over the last decade, now that reverse
payment settlements raise a substantial risk of antitrust liability, the
question becomes whether the licensing approach will prove a viable,
if imperfect, substitute. We have already seen at least one settlement
agreement that approximates the licensing approach. In 1987, Barr
Laboratories filed an ANDA seeking to market a generic version of
tamoxifen and included a paragraph IV certification.22 1 In response,
the pharmaceutical patent-holder, Zeneca, sued for patent
infringement. After the district court held Zeneca's patent invalid,
and while the case was on appeal to the Federal Circuit, the parties
settled. 222 In return for a $21 million payment and a non-exclusive
license to sell Zeneca-manufactured tamoxifen under Barr's label,
Barr agreed to change its ANDA certification from paragraph IV to
paragraph III and to wait until Zeneca's patent expired in 2002 before
it would begin marketing its own generic version of tamoxifen.223
Because of the $21 million reverse payment, this agreement
would presumably violate the antitrust laws under the Actavis
decision.2 24 Yet, the other aspects of the parties' settlement agreement
set forth a possible framework for a pure licensing settlement going
forward. To satisfy the standard in Actavis, the parties would have to
reduce the reverse payment, perhaps until it reflected no more than

customers to a new product with no generic equivalent." FTC Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 7, at 6.
221. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 193.
222. As part of the settlement, the parties jointly petitioned the Federal Circuit to
dismiss the appeal as moot and to vacate the district court's judgment. Id. at 194.
Following its procedure at the time, the Federal Circuit granted the motion and vacated
the district court judgment. See Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Heumann Pharma GmbH
& Co., No. 92-1403, 1993 WL 118931, at *1 (Fed. Cir. March 19, 1993). The Court
subsequently held that such a vacatur was improper and invalid in nearly all circumstances.
See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Banner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 27-29 (1994).
223. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 193-94.
224. According to the Actavis Court, in a rule-of-reason inquiry, we would initially
focus on the size of the $21 million payment, its relation to the patentee's anticipated
future litigation costs, its independence from other services from the defendant that might
justify the payment, and the lack of any other precompetitive justification. Actavis, 133 S.
Ct. at 2237. If litigation costs for this type of claim are approximately $8 to $10 million, see
Barr Pharmaceuticals Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Aug. 24, 2001), then a $21
million payment might seem unreasonably large.
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the litigation costs that settling would save. 225 Given that HatchWaxman pharmaceutical-patent litigation is expensive, this might not
require much reduction, but it would likely require some.226 To
compensate Barr for the reduced reverse payment, the parties could
agree to a lower licensing fee on Barr's sales of the Zenecamanufactured generic. 227 At the same time, if the licensing fee was set
to maintain the retail price at a profit-maximizing level, rather than as
a rent division mechanism, the license could instead simply switch and
stipulate a minimum resale price directly.2" Such an approach would
sharply limit the generic's ability to cheat on the parties' deal by
offering the generic version at a lower price in order to maximize its
own profits.229
While it is possible to extend the Actavis rationale to find that
such licensed generic entry arrangements violate section 1, the lack of
a large reverse payment to trigger the inference of actual competitive
harm presents a potential stumbling block.230 In Actavis, the Court
225. Again, this would depend on the size of the payment relative to the saved
litigation costs for the patentee, as well as the other legitimate bases for such a payment
that the Court identified. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
226. Id. at 2234.
227. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 215 ("The license ensured that money also flowed
from Barr to Zeneca, decreasing the value of the reverse payment.").
228. It is not clear whether the license agreement between the parties used a per-dose
license fee or a stipulated minimum retail price as a mechanism to keep prices at the
appropriate level. But whatever mechanism the parties adopted, it seemed to work. In a
subsequent antitrust lawsuit, "[tihe plaintiffs allege[d] that the Barr-distributed Zenecamanufactured tamoxifen sold at retail for just five percent less than the Zeneca-branded
version." Id. at 216; see also id. at 194 n.9 ("After the Settlement Agreement,.. . Barr
began to market its licensed version of Zeneca's tamoxifen, selling its product to
distributors and wholesalers at a 15 percent discount to the brand-name price, which
translated into a price to consumers about five percent below Zeneca's otherwise identical
Nolvadex@ brand-name version. Barr soon captured about 80 percent of the tamoxifen
market.").
229. In the Tamoxifen case itself, the price for the licensed generic version remained
just 5% below the branded version throughout the license term. Id. at 216. In contrast,
unlicensed generics, on average, sell for only 15% of the price of the branded
pharmaceutical. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2012) ("The
FTC estimates that about one year after market entry an average generic pharmaceutical
product takes over ninety percent of the patent holder's unit sales and sells for fifteen
percent of the price of the name brand product.").
230. It may prove a stumbling block, particularly for those judges who mistake licensed
entry for competition because they apparently do not have a rudimentary understanding
of economic principles. See In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 215 (Sack, J.) ("By licensing
tamoxifen to Barr, Zeneca added a competitor to the market, however limited the
competition may have been."). In antitrust and economics, two parties do not compete if
one sets the prices for both. With the tamoxifen settlement, consumers may have had a
choice between the brand and the licensed generic, but as Zeneca set the price for both,
the two did not compete. Rather, Zeneca was pursuing a multi-brand strategy, offering
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suggested "the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a
workable surrogate for a patent's weakness."2 31 For the Prozac
example, we can use equations (5) and (7) to calculate: (i) the
minimum payment Barr will accept to enter into a reverse payment
settlement; (ii) the maximum payment Eli Lilly will offer to enter into
such a settlement; and (iii) the mean reverse payment. Table 3
presents the results.
Table 3

Reverse Payment Values as a Function of Eli Lilly's Chance of
Winning
R
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Barr's Minimum
($10,000,000)
$19,420,000
$48,840,000
$78,260,000
$107,680,000
$137,100,000
$166,520,000
$195,940,000
$225,360,000
$254,780,000
$284,200,000

Eli Lilly's Maximum
$10,000,000
$339,000,000
$668,000,000
$997,000,000
$1,326,000,000
$1,655,000,000
$1,984,000,000
$2,313,000,000
$2,642,000,000
$2,971,000,000
$3,300,000,000

Mean
$0
$179,210,000
$358,420,000
$537,630,000
$716,840,000
$896,050,000
$1,075,260,000
$1,254,470,000
$1,433,680,000
$1,612,890,000
$1,792,100,000

As Table 3 reflects, the mean payment value increases steadily as
Eli Lilly's chance of success falls from 100% to zero. But the
inference is not as strong as the Actavis Court may hope. The mean
payment value is simply the halfway point between the minimum
reverse payment Barr would accept and the maximum Eli Lilly would
be willing to pay. While a reverse payment anywhere between those
two values would make both parties better off settling rather than
litigating, neither economic theory nor any other theory provides
much guidance as to where within that range we should expect the
reverse payment to fall. A generic manufacturer with a very effective
and skillful. negotiator may be able to extract near the maximum
reverse payment from a risk averse pharmaceutical patent-holder,
particularly one that ties its officers' compensation to its stock
different brands at different prices, in order to price discriminate and to maximize its rents
from the associated market.
231. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236-37.
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performance.23 2 In such a case, using the Prozac numbers, the generic
might plausibly extract a $300 million reverse payment, even if the
pharmaceutical patent-holder had a 90% chance of success. On the
other hand, if the generic manufacturer is the more risk averse or a
relatively poor negotiator, the generic might only extract a reverse
payment near the minimum. In such a case, again using the Prozac
numbers, the generic might extract only a $255 million reverse
payment, even when the pharmaceutical patent-holder has only a
10% chance of success. Depending on the relative bargaining ability
of the parties, and holding the market size at issue constant, we might
well, but for Actavis, have seen instances where larger payments were
made in cases involving strong patents and smaller payments were
made in cases involving weak patents. Nevertheless, if we assume
that, on average, the relative bargaining ability of various generic
manufacturers and the relative risk aversion of pharmaceutical
patent-holders remain roughly the same across parties, the size of the
reverse payment provides at least some evidence as to the parties'
judgment concerning the relative strength of the patent at issue.
In contrast, in a license agreement, the minimum retail price is
not likely to prove a reliable indicator of the strength of the patents at
issue. Whether the patent at issue is strong or weak, in either case, the
patent-holder will impose, and the generic will agree to, a minimum
retail price that maximizes the rents generated by the pharmaceutical
patent. That is the price that maximizes the size of the pie the parties
will share. Whether the patent at issue is strong or weak, both parties
will want to maximize the associated rents.
Although agreeing to a specific minimum retail price is not
evidence of a patent's weakness, the parties' settlement agreement
will reflect their judgment regarding the patent's strength. However,
that judgment will be reflected, not in the minimum retail price, but in
the division of the rents as between the parties. In the same way that
we should expect the size of the reverse payment to correlate with a
patent's weakness, so too should the division of rents. As the patent
becomes weaker and the generic's chance of winning the litigation
232. As I have explained elsewhere, a pharmaceutical patent-holder's stock can fall
disproportionately in response to a loss in significant patent litigation. See Lunney, supra
note 75, at 46-48 (showing that Eli Lilly's stock experienced a -29.20% abnormal return on
the day of the Federal Circuit's Prozac decision and a one-day loss in market capitalization
of $35.754 billion); see also Laura E. Pannatoni, The Effect of ParagraphIV Decisions and
Generic Entry Before Patent Expiration on Brand PharmaceuticalFirms, 30 J. HEALTH
ECON. 126, 127 (2011) (using an event study of litigation outcomes in paragraph IV
certification cases and finding a median loss in market capitalization of $387.78 million
when the patent-holder lost the case at the district court).
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increases, the generic should be able to negotiate a larger share of the
rents a licensed-entry agreement will protect and generate. As with
reverse payments, the correlation is not perfect. Given the large gains
in trade available in these settlements, there is a wide range of agreed
rent divisions that would make both parties better off compared to
litigating. Just as with reverse payments, a shrewd generic may be
able to extract a larger share of the rents from a pharmaceutical
patent-holder with a strong patent than a naive generic can extract
even facing a weak patent. Nevertheless, we should expect, on
average, that a generic's ability to extract a larger share of the rents
available should provide the same sort of "workable surrogate for a
patent's weakness" that a reverse payment provides.233
Whether a court will extend the Actavis Court's reasoning to find
a rule of reason violation based upon a settlement agreement that
allows licensed generic entry is unclear. Unlike reverse payments,
licenses that allow a defendant to practice the patented invention in
return for sharing the financial returns in some fashion or another are
exceedingly common as a means for resolving all sorts of patent
litigation.2 34 The allocation of the returns may also depend on the
labor and capital contributions of both parties in ways that are
complicated and vary across industries. Where a substantial reverse
payment may make the weakness of the associated patent facially
evident, it may be far more difficult to sort the sheep from the goats
by attempting to parse the rent allocation within a license agreement
that permits licensed generic entry.
Thus, the Court's decision in Actavis, although a very
encouraging step in the right direction, leaves more work to be done.
In the next part, I take up what steps we need to take next.
IV. LOOKING FOR A LONG TERM CURE: OF DISEASES AND
SYMPTOMS

If we are to cure the disease and not merely treat one symptom,
we must first identify the underlying factor or factors that led parties
to use reverse payments to settle pharmaceutical-patent litigation.
While there are several reasons, they all eventually tie back to one
233. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236-37.
234. Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV.
375, 395 (2014) (citing Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases
Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent
Disputes, 84 WASH. L. REV. 237, 272 (2006)) (stating that "the vast majority of patent
cases [about 65-68%] settle" and that ."patent litigation is largely a settlement
mechanism").
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central consideration: The party making the decision whether to settle
or litigate does not capture the full benefit of a successful challenge to
a pharmaceutical patent. Rather than flow to any one generic
manufacturer, or even to all of them together,235 most of the benefits
from a successful challenge to a pharmaceutical patent flow to
consumers through lower prices.236 While there is a certain overlap in
the generic's and consumers' interests, we should not expect a generic
manufacturer to protect consumers' interests at the expense of its
own. Rather, we should fully expect the generic to settle when settling
is in its own best interest, even if the settlement imposes substantial
and unjustified costs on consumers.
Identifying the underlying causal factors suggests a number of
possible approaches to solving the underlying problem that led to
reverse payment settlements. We might try to give consumers a more
direct voice in the litigation, for example, by requiring judicial
approval of any settlement as we do in class action litigation or by
giving the FTC the power to intervene in pharmaceutical-patent
litigation. Alternatively, we might continue to rely on the current
approach of relying on a generic company to vindicate the public
interest. If we do, the question becomes whether there are any further
steps we should take to align the private interest of the generic more
fully with the public interest. In part, this depends upon how parties
respond to the Actavis decision.
As we move forward, we should watch for two types of
settlements that, if present, will indicate continued problems with the
Hatch-Waxman approach, even after Actavis. First, we may find that
parties settle on terms that allow licensed generic entry with an
agreed resale price for the generic version of the pharmaceutical. If
235. In a recent paper, Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein propose a solution to this
long-recognized problem in intellectual property litigation. See Gideon Parchomovsky &
Alex Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1483, 1483 (2013).
Specifically, they propose a voluntary-joinder mechanism for defendants that would
require other similarly situated defendants to contribute to the cost of one defendant's
successful defense. While such a mechanism may help a little, it will not help much. Even
if all the generics have to contribute, they still have far less to gain as a group than a
pharmaceutical patent-holder has to lose, and they capture only a fraction of the rents
redistributed by a successful defense.
236. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234 (presenting a hypothetical in which a patentee
generates $500 million in revenue and noting that "[c]ontinued litigation, if it results in
patent invalidation or a finding of non-infringement, could cost the patentee $500 million
in lost revenues, a sum that then would flow in large part to consumers in the form of
lower prices"); see also In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2012)
(noting that the FTC estimates that a generic typically "sells for fifteen percent of the
price of the name brand product"; as a result, "consumers, rather than generic producers,
are typically the biggest beneficiaries of generic entry").
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this type of settlement becomes common, that would suggest that
parties are simply substituting licensed generic entry settlements for
reverse payment settlements as the preferred mechanism for
preserving weak pharmaceutical patents. Second, we may find that
parties settle using the variable-time-of-entry format but with entry
consistently delayed until the last six months of the patent's life. If
this type of settlement becomes common, that would suggest that
generic challengers are not proving very effective at negotiating for
an early time of entry against weak patents.
In the next two subsections, I take up how we might address
these two indications that Hatch-Waxman is still not working as
intended.
A.

Dealing with Licensed Generic Entry Settlements

If licensed generic entry settlements become common postActavis, suggesting that licensed entry settlements have become the
preferred method for insulating weak pharmaceutical patents from
challenge, there are two approaches we might use within the existing
Hatch-Waxman structure to address this issue. First, we could modify
the Hatch-Waxman rules to tie the 180-day exclusivity to a
"successful" assertion of a paragraph IV certification.2 37 As an initial
step, we could add effective forfeiture provisions, so that the first filer
loses the 180-day period if it does not obtain immediate entry. As a
next step, we could encourage additional generic challengers by
giving the second filer with a paragraph IV certification an
opportunity to claim the 180-day generic exclusivity if the first filer
loses it. Second, and alternatively, we could extend the reasoning of
Actavis to bar the use of such a settlement structure under the
antitrust laws.
Modifying Hatch-Waxman to tie generic exclusivity to a
"successful" assertion of a paragraph IV certification seeks to bring
237. As previously discussed, the FDA once tied the grant of the 180-day generic
exclusivity to a "successful defense" in patent litigation. See supra notes 50-52. Scott
Hemphill and Mark Lemley have proposed re-adopting this approach but would expand
"successful defense" to include two additional situations: (i) where the pharmaceutical
patent-holder does not sue; and (ii) where the parties settle on terms that allow immediate
generic entry. C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug
Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 949 (2011); see also S. 504,
113th Cong., § 2 (2013) (proposing a similar approach). Presumably, they would limit the
second option to cases where the generic enters with its own generic version of the
medication, so that the 180-day exclusivity period begins to run, rather than entering with
a generic version provided by the pharmaceutical patent-holder, which might not start the
exclusivity period.
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the interests of the generic litigant and consumers more fully into
alignment by reducing the fraction of the redistributed rents the
generic captures when it settles in a manner likely to be contrary to
the interests of consumers. Congress made some attempt at using this
method when it adopted rules providing that a generic would forfeit
the 180-day exclusivity as part of the Medicare Modernization Act of
2003.23' As it turned out, however, those provisions lacked much in
the way of teeth.239 We could also combine the discouragement to the
first filer to settle litigation from forfeiting exclusivity, with
encouragement to a second ANDA filer, by allowing the 180-day
generic exclusivity to pass to the second filer if the first filer fails to
vindicate the purposes of the exclusivity period (the "floating
exclusivity" approach). 24 Scott Hemphill and Mark Lemley have
proposed such an approach, 241' and Congress has considered it. 242
While these sorts of modifications have a certain common-sense
appeal,243 they are not likely to prove effective and may have
unintended, adverse consequences.
The idea behind these modifications is to change the relative
costs and benefits of settlement versus litigation enough so that, in at
least some cases, the parties can no longer find settlement terms that
preserve a weak patent while making both sides better off compared
to litigating. For the generic challenger, adopting stronger forfeiture
rules would increase the amount a generic would demand in the
licensed generic entry settlement as its share of the patent-generated
rents. Under the existing rules, settling may delay the onset of the
180-day generic-exclusivity period, but settling does not cause the
generic challenger to lose the exclusivity period altogether. In
contrast, under stronger forfeiture rules, or a "successful defense"
238.
L. No.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
108-173 § 1102, 117 Stat. 2066, 2457-60.
See, e.g., Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 237, at 971, 989.
Id. at 983-84.
Id.
S.504,113th Cong., § 2 (2013).
As Scott Hemphill and Mark Lemley have argued:

The point of giving generic firms 180-day exclusivity is to encourage them to
challenge weak patents and enter the market earlier, lowering prices and
benefiting consumers. But 180-day exclusivity has been hijacked. Today, it is a tool
that encourages weak challenges to patents in the hopes of prompting settlement,
and leads generic firms to settle even strong challenges for delayed entry in
exchange for keeping their exclusivity. Consumers are arguably worse off than
they would be with no 180-day exclusivity at all. The system can be dramatically
improved by a simple rule: Want to get paid a bounty? Earn it.
Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 237, at 989.
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rule, or some variation thereof,2" a generic that agreed to settle and
wait, for example, until the last six months before the expiration of
the patent(s) at issue to enter would lose the exclusivity period
altogether. For a generic, the rents earned during the 180-day
exclusivity period far exceed the rents earned once generic entry
occurs generally. Recall in the Prozac example that Barr earned over
$360 million in its first year selling a generic version of fluoxetine with
generic exclusivity and only a little over $7 million each year
thereafter. If Barr can settle, agree to enter when the patents have
nearly expired, and still retain its 180-day generic exclusivity, then
Barr will settle for far less than it would if Barr forfeited the 180-day
generic exclusivity period by settling. As a result, this sort of rule
change would substantially increase the amount, whether as a direct
reverse payment or as a share of the patent-generated rents, Barr
would demand before it would settle.
At the same time, changing the rules to allow for floating
exclusivity would also reduce the amount a pharmaceutical patentholder would be willing to pay to settle any given case. If we allow the
180-day generic exclusivity period to pass to a second ANDA filer if
the first filer loses it, any payment or share of the patent-protected
rents that a pharmaceutical patent-holder offered the first filer in
return for dropping a challenge to its patent, the patent-holder would
expect to have to pay to the second filer, the third filer, and each
successive generic challenger as well. So, presumably, a patent-holder
would be willing to pay somewhat less to settle with any given generic
challenger.
With the generic challenger demanding more and the
pharmaceutical patent-holder willing to pay less, changing the rules
and tying the exclusivity period to some measure of "success" in
defending the paragraph IV certification may, at the margins, make it
more difficult for the parties to find settlement terms that preserve a
weak patent while still making both parties better off settling rather
than litigating. As a result, it may effectively prevent the parties from
settling on anticompetitive terms.
However, as it turns out, the desirability of tying generic
exclusivity to a successful assertion of a paragraph IV certification is
more complicated than it may initially appear. First, it may not move
the margins much and thus may render unattractive only a small sliver
of anticompetitive settlements. Second, it may move the margins too
much and lead to successive litigation that inappropriately invalidates
244. See supra notes 238-43 and accompanying text.
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even quite strong patents. Third, it effectively precludes the parties
from settling using the variable-time-of-entry structure that the
Actavis Court suggested.
As to the first two concerns, whether tying exclusivity to a
successful defense of the paragraph IV certification would move the
margins none, some, or too much depends on two factors: (i) whether
barriers to entry, the time patent litigation requires, or other
considerations effectively limit the number of successive generic
challengers a patent-holder will face; and (ii) the extent to which, if at
all, a final judgment in the patent-holder's favor against one generic
challenger increases the likelihood that the patent-holder will prevail
against subsequent generic challengers. With respect to the first
factor, while, in theory, the number of potential generic challengers is
unlimited, practical concerns may limit the number of successive
generic challengers a pharmaceutical patent-holder can expect to
face. In particular, the tacit knowledge and other information costs
associated with becoming an effective pharmaceutical patent litigator,
as well as imperfections in the financial markets that limit financing
for such litigation, may help limit the number of generic challengers.
In addition, the time required to complete patent litigation may also
limit the number of successive challenges that can be heard within any
given patent's life. With respect to the second, as a formal matter,
under existing law, non-mutual collateral estoppel bars a losing
patent-holder from re-litigating an earlier finding of invalidity or noninfringement against a subsequent generic challenger.245 It does not,
however, bar one generic challenger from re-litigating those issues
based upon another generic defendant's loss. Yet, while not creating a
formal estoppel, the decision of one court to reject invalidity defenses
and find infringement may strongly influence another court's
subsequent decision on those same issues. With all appeals being
heard by panels of the Federal Circuit and many aspects of patent law
becoming legal, rather than factual issues, inconsistent validity and
infringement results are unlikely. Even if not formally binding on a
later court, one court's rejection of the invalidity and noninfringement contentions of a generic challenger may well
substantially reduce, if not eliminate, other generic challengers'
chances of success on those issues.
In any event, whether the number of generic challengers is
limited or unlimited, whether one victory for a patent-holder
forecloses defeat or leaves the patent just as vulnerable as it was
245. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971).
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before the victory, we can illustrate how tying exclusivity to a
successful assertion of a paragraph IV certification will change the
settlement margins not much or too much by examining two possible
scenarios. In the first scenario, there are a limited number, n, of
generic challengers to a pharmaceutical patent-holder; and a final
judgment of validity and infringement against any one of the generic
challengers effectively binds the rest. In the second, there are
unlimited generic challengers, and a final judgment of validity and
infringement against any one of them does not change the
pharmaceutical patent-holder's chance of success in subsequent
litigation.
If the assumptions in the first scenario match the real world, then
tying the exclusivity period to success will not change the margins
much, as long as the number of generic challengers, n, remains small.
To see this, we can extend our game theory model to account for n
challengers. To ensure more than one generic challenger, we will
assume that we modify Hatch-Waxman so that a generic forfeits the
180-day exclusivity period when it settles and that the right to the
exclusivity period then passes to the next generic filer in line. 2" Given
the Court's decision in Actavis, the parties will not use the reverse
payment settlement structure but will instead adopt a licensed entry
settlement.2 47 Once a generic challenger proves its seriousness in the
initial stages of the litigation, the pharmaceutical patent-holder will
offer each generic challenger licensed entry, set a profit-maximizing
minimum retail price, and divide the resulting rents, such that each
challenger receives rents with a discounted present value, P.248 The
pharmaceutical patent-holder can either: (i) settle and offer a share of

246. If a generic forfeits the 180-day exclusivity period by settling, but the right to the
exclusivity period does not pass to the second filer, then the pharmaceutical patent-holder
can offer lower payments to the subsequent filers. In such a scenario, the number of
challengers would have to be much higher before the pharmaceutical patent-holder will
run out of the rents necessary to pay off each challenger.
247. This will depend on how the district and appellate courts apply Actavis. Over
time, the Actavis decision may prove only a minor irritant to the use of reverse payment
settlements, but I am assuming that the decision will lead parties for alternative settlement
arrangements that minimize the risk of antitrust exposure. But the framework I use would
apply equally as well to reverse payment settlements.
248. Note that the use of P here is intentional. I am pointing out that a licensed entry
agreement can amount to nothing more than a reverse payment settlement, except that,
rather than a one-time reverse payment of P to stay out, a licensing settlement of this sort,
allows entry, and then provides the generic with an identical effective payment, P,
amounting to the discounted present value of the rents allocated to the generic by the
settlement agreement. The anticompetitive consequences result from the minimum resale
price.
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its rents with a value, P, to each generic; or (ii) it can litigate once.249
The patent-holder will settle so long as:
X,,- nP : RX, - C.

(12)

As we saw in our analysis of reverse payment settlements, each
generic will settle so long as:
P : (1-R) X, 5 C.

(7)

Settlement will make all parties better off compared to litigating
so long as equations (12) and (7) are both satisfied. In turn, both
equations can be satisfied so long as there are relatively few generic
challengers, such that:
n 5 ((1-R)X,, + C)/((1-R)X,, - C).

(13)

As defined in equation (13), n represents the number of generic
challengers to whom a pharmaceutical patent-holder can offer a given
share of its monopoly rents, such that both the patent-holder and
each of the generic challengers are better off settling rather than
litigating. When we apply equation (13) to the numbers I generated
for Barr Laboratories and Eli Lilly for the Prozac example, n remains
roughly constant for a wide range of expected chances of success. As
the parties' shared estimate of Eli Lilly's chance of success rises from
zero to 70%, n rises from 11.61 to 12.74.250 In other words, even if Eli
Lilly had virtually no chance of success in the litigation, so long as
there were fewer than eleven generic challengers to buy off, Eli Lilly
would be able to do so. Because the rents available with patent
protection so far exceed those available with generic entry, even if
each generic thinks it can be the first to win and claim the 180-day
generic exclusivity, Eli Lilly could offer each of the eleven a share of
its patent rents that would exceed their expected return from
litigating.
If the patent-holder expects there to be more than n serious
generic challengers, then the parties will be unable to find acceptable
settlement terms. Using the Eli Lilly numbers, if there are, for
example, more than fifteen serious challengers, then whether Eli
Lilly's patent is weak or strong, in either case, Eli Lilly will choose to
litigate because there are too many challengers to compensate. Thus,
249. It only has to litigate once given our assumption that the outcome in the first final
judgment effectively binds the parties in subsequent litigation.
250. It may seem strange that the number changes so little, but this results from the
fact that as Eli Lilly's chance of success falls, it has to pay each generic somewhat more to
settle but so does the maximum total amount Eli Lilly is willing to pay to preserve its
patent.
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this approach separates weak from strong patents, not of its own
virtue, but through litigation. When there are more than fifteen
serious challengers, Eli Lilly's patent, whether weak or strong, will be
litigated. When litigated, we expect, on average, the strong patent to
prevail, while the weak patent fails. The floating exclusivity approach
thus duplicates the result of a no-settlement rule in this first scenario.
Realizing that there will be too many challengers to pay each of them
off, the patent-holder will litigate rather than settle. At that point, the
floating exclusivity approach shares the strengths of the no-settlement
rule. Cases are litigated, rather than settled, with the result that some
patents prevail, while others fail. But in each case, so long as the
patent rules are working appropriately, success and failure should, on
average, reflect the patent system's judgment regarding the effective
protection sufficient and necessary to encourage desirable innovation.
The probable advantage of this approach, compared to a more
straightforward no-settlement rule, is that it achieves a no-settlement
result without appearing to prohibit settlement. Frankly, however, if
floating exclusivity achieves our goals by amounting to a nosettlement rule, I would prefer an explicit no-settlement rule. A nosettlement rule is both more straightforward and honest, leaving less
room for parties to complain of unfair surprise. And it does not
require more than eleven serious generic challengers (using the
numbers from the Prozac example) to work; it requires only one.
If we adopt the floating exclusivity approach, it is simply unclear
whether there would be more than the n generic challengers
necessary to replicate the no-settlement rule result. As discussed,
under its current rules, the FDA awards exclusivity to the first
ANDA application that includes a paragraph IV certification. If on
the day that the first such ANDA is filed more than one applicant
files such an ANDA, then they are all considered "first applicants,"
and they share the exclusivity period.2 5' Some drugs have been subject
to as many as sixteen first applicants; and in 2005, the average number
of first applicants was eleven.252 But the mere filing of a paragraph IV
certification does not establish that an applicant would actually have
followed through with litigation. If we look at successive litigation
251. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb) (2012). When there is more than one first
applicant, the 180-day exclusivity runs from the date "of the first commercial marketing of
the drug (including the commercial marketing of the listed drug) by any first applicant."
Id. § 355()(5)(B)(iv)(I).
252. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2246 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(quoting Brief for the Generic Pharm. Assoc. as Amicus Curiae at 23-24, Actavis, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2223 (No. 12-416)).
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challenges more directly, since the D.C. Circuit forced the FDA to
eliminate the "successful defense" requirement for exclusivity,"
successive challenges to a patent or set of patents directed at a single
pharmaceutical market have become less common. Even when the
"successful defense" rule was in place, and successive generic
challenges occurred, they typically involved far fewer than eleven
successive challenges. In the case of tamoxifen, for example, after a
settlement with the initial challenger, only three more generic
challengers jumped into the fray by filing paragraph IV
certifications.254 In the case of ciprofloxacin, after a settlement with
the first generic challenger, only four more generic challengers
jumped into the fray by filing paragraph IV certifications.255
Thus, in the first scenario, tying the generic exclusivity award to
successful entry might not move the margins very much. So long as
the number of generic manufacturers willing to finance and pursue
pharmaceutical-patent litigation remains small, and so long as one
final judgment effectively binds all subsequent challengers,
anticompetitive settlements will still occur. Even for very weak
patents, the parties will still be able to find a division of rents that
would make each of them better off by allowing the patent to remain
standing than they would be litigating.256 Moreover, we should not
fool ourselves as to h*ow a floating exclusivity approach works in this
first scenario. When the number of serious generic challengers
exceeds n and the approach works, it works by merely achieving
indirectly with many challengers what a no-settlement rule achieves
directly with only one generic challenger.
In contrast, in the second scenario, a floating exclusivity
approach will move the margins too much. In the second scenario,
where there are an unlimited number of generic challengers, and a
253. See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Granutec,
Inc. v. Shalala, Nos. 97-1873, 97-1874, 1998 WL 153410, at *7 (4th Cir. April 3, 1998).
254. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 194-95 (2d Cir. 2006) ("In
the years after the parties entered into the Settlement Agreement and the Federal Circuit
vacated the district court's judgment, three other generic manufacturers filed ANDAs
with paragraph IV certifications to secure approval of their respective generic versions of
tamoxifen....").
255. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir.

2008).
256. Moreover, if there are more than eleven challengers against the weak patent,
there might very well be enough challengers to foreclose such a settlement structure, even
for a strong patent. Thus, this modification to Hatch-Waxman might de facto impose a nosettlement rule. While I am comfortable with such a rule regime, I believe that if such a
regime is to be imposed, it should be imposed directly and expressly so that parties
understand the consequences of filing a paragraph IV certification.
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final judgment of validity and infringement against any one of them
does not change the pharmaceutical patent-holder's chance of success
against the rest, nearly every valuable pharmaceutical patent, no
matter how strong, would be struck down. So long as the chance of
success was sufficient, given the expected rents available from
winning to cover the generic challenger's expected litigation expenses,
it would be rational for a generic challenger to pursue litigation.
Under this scenario, if that generic challenger lost, this would not
alter the chances that a second challenger could win. So if it was
economically rational for the first generic challenger to pursue
litigation and the second paragraph IV filer could step into the shoes
of the first and claim the 180-day generic exclusivity period, it would
be equally rational for a second and a third and a fourth to pursue the
same claim. Moreover, given an unlimited number of challengers, the
pharmaceutical patent-holder would not be able to divide the
available rents in a manner that would make each of the challengers
better off settling rather than litigating. If there were only five or six
generic challengers, as in the first scenario, dividing the rents and
settling would be possible. But, in this scenario, there might be 100
challengers, and while the rents available from a pharmaceutical
patent can be large, there would simply not be enough to persuade
each of the hundred to drop their claims.
As a result, in this second scenario, so long as the expected
chance of success for the generic, given the expected rents, covered
the expected litigation expenses,2 57 tying the 180-day exclusivity to
success would lead to, in theory, an infinite and, in practice, perhaps a
very large, number of generic challenges. Facing a large number of
challenges, sooner or later, even very strong pharmaceutical patents
would be struck down. While a very strong patent might not be struck
down in the first case, or the second, or the third, if we set up the
Hatch-Waxman rules to ensure repeated challenges, sooner or later, it
would be.
While, in my opinion, the second scenario is not very likely, it
serves an important cautionary role. Not all patents that lead to high
prices are bad for society. Although I have referred to the profits
collected from pharmaceutical patents as "rents," some of them are
better characterized as "quasi-rents." They may look like rents, in the
sense that they derive from prices in excess of marginal costs-prices
257. In the Prozac litigation, where a successful generic challenger expected to capture
$287.4 million by winning the litigation, the challenger would pursue the litigation, even at
an expected cost of $10 million, so long as it estimated its chance of success as greater than
3.5%.
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that are, in that sense, supracompetitive. For some pharmaceutical
inventions, they are nonetheless justified because they cover the
research and development costs necessary to bring forth the
pharmaceutical invention at issue-costs that would not be reflected
or recovered under marginal cost pricing. As we devise our HatchWaxman mechanism, we need to ensure that while it encourages
desirable challenges against weak patents, it does not also encourage
undesirable challenges against strong patents. Tying the award of
generic exclusivity to a successful defense or to immediate entry, and
allowing the award to transfer to a second filer in the event of
forfeiture, has the potential to do so.258
The third problem that arises from tying generic exclusivity to a
successful paragraph IV assertion is that it would effectively preclude
the parties from settling using the variable time-of-entry strategy that
the Actavis Court suggested. As we have discussed, parties to
pharmaceutical patent litigation, rather than allowing immediate
entry or waiting for a patent to expire, can agree to some
intermediate time at which the patent becomes invalid and generic
entry begins. Under the existing Hatch-Waxman rules, a generic
challenger would retain its 180-day exclusivity under this framework.
It would just be a question of whether it received the generic
exclusivity sooner or later. As I have shown, under the existing
Hatch-Waxman exclusivity rules, the parties can always find some
intermediate time for generic entry to begin, such that the resulting
allocation of rents makes both parties better off settling, rather than
litigating."'
However, if we tie the 180-day exclusivity to success in the
litigation or to immediate entry, so that a generic challenger that
settles for delayed entry loses its right to the generic exclusivity
period, this approach to settlement will no longer prove viable. By
taking away the 180-day exclusivity, the parties would no longer be
able to find a time for entry that will make both of them better off
compared to litigating. The 180-day generic exclusivity period is
simply too valuable to the generic challenger.
To illustrate, in the Prozac example, Eli Lilly and Barr might
both agree that Eli Lilly had a strong patent claim, with an 80%.
258. Under the current regime, this does not seem to be a problem. Generics tend to
challenge weaker patents under the current regime where only the first filer can claim the
180-day generic exclusivity period. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do
Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 613,613 (2011).
259. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013); supra text accompanying
notes 201-02.
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chance of success, or they might both agree that Eli Lilly had weak
patent claims, with only a 20% chance of success. In either case, so
long as Barr gets to keep its 180-day exclusivity as the first paragraph
IV filer, they could find a time for generic entry that would divide the
available rents so as to make both of them better off settling rather
than litigating.26
In contrast, if Barr loses its 180-day generic exclusivity as a result
of entering into such a delayed entry settlement, the parties would no
longer be able to find a time for entry that works. As previously
discussed, most of Barr's rents came from the 180-day exclusivity
period. Take that away, and even immediate entry will not generate
much in the way of rents for Barr. Even if Eli Lilly agreed to
invalidate its patents and allow Barr and the other generics
immediate entry, that would not be sufficient to compensate Barr for
the loss of the generic exclusivity period. Without the 180-day
exclusivity period, the discounted present value of immediate generic
entry to Barr would only be $14.2 million for the thirty-four months at
issue. The only cases where Barr might be willing to accept a variable
time of entry settlement offer and lose its generic exclusivity period,
would be those where Barr believed Eli Lilly was nearly certain to
win. Only in those cases would Barr's expected return on litigating
and keeping the generic exclusivity be less than $14.2 million.
However, once Eli Lilly's chance of success fell below near certain
victory, Barr would be better off litigating. Because of the value of
the 180-day generic exclusivity to Barr, even a relatively small chance
of winning and earning the generic exclusivity would make litigating a
better option than settling, if settling meant losing the generic
exclusivity period. Yet, in those cases where Barr would be willing to
settle for quick generic entry, even if it meant a loss of the generic
exclusivity period, Eli Lilly would not be willing to offer it. If Eli Lilly
was reasonably certain to win, Eli Lilly would be far better off
litigating than it would be settling on terms that allowed Barr quick
generic entry.
For these reasons, tying 180-day generic exclusivity to a generic's
success in asserting a paragraph IV certification is probably unwise.
While such an approach might prevent some anticompetitive
settlements, it would not likely prove very effective at reducing the
number of such settlements. At least in theory, there is also some
possibility that it may lead to an excessive number of generic
challenges and threaten the patent system's goal of encouraging
260. See supra text accompanying notes 165-72 and 201-05.
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desirable innovation by substantially weakening patents generally.
More likely and more importantly, tying exclusivity to success would
limit the ability of the parties to settle pharmaceutical patent
litigation by setting an intermediate time for generic entry to begin.
As this variable-time-of-entry settlement structure offers one of the
most promising mechanisms for leaving the parties free to pursue
their own self-interest, yet still achieve the goals of both the patent
and antitrust laws, we should avoid changing the generic exclusivity
rules in a manner that would effectively foreclose such settlements.
These problems would seem to suggest that extending Actavis to
impose antitrust liability for licensed generic entry settlements
represents the preferred alternative. As discussed, the basic structure
of the argument for imposing rule-of-reason liability on licensed
generic entry settlements follows the structure of the argument the
Actavis Court used to impose rule-of-reason liability on reverse
payment settlements. A licensed entry settlement that allocates a
large share of the resulting rents to the generic challenger signals both
market power and patent weakness in the same way that a large
reverse payment does.2 61 Moreover, just as in the reverse payment
context, the inference that a licensed entry settlement unreasonably
restrains trade becomes compelling given the parties' decision to
forego a variable-time-of-entry settlement structure that would lack
the potential for anticompetitive consequences. If we extend Actavis,
then that still leaves us with the problem of ineffective generic
challengers willing to settle for the latest acceptable entry date. Given
that most of the value to the generic from entry comes from the 180day generic exclusivity period, we may see many generics settle so
long as they can receive their 180-day exclusivity at the very end of
the patent's life.
B.

Extending Actavis: Allow Only Variable Time Settlements

While the Actavis Court offered variable time of entry
settlements simply as an alternative means to settle pharmaceuticalpatent litigation,2 62 I would go further and suggest that the Court
should require such an approach to settlements of pharmaceuticalpatent litigation. Such an approach channels the self-interest of the
generic manufacturer so that it tends to act in the best interest of
consumers. By prohibiting side payments, whether direct or through a
licensed division of rents, the generic's sole source of rents derives
261. See supra text accompanying notes 213-35.

262. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
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from entering as early as possible. As a result, we do not need to
assign a third party, whether a judge, the FTC, or some other actor, to
safeguard consumers from unnecessary monopoly power. The
generic's own interests will lead it to act in a manner that vindicates
the purposes of the antitrust laws by seeking the earliest possible
entry.
The problem with this approach, under the current HatchWaxman structure, is that it places the generic in the position
between choosing: (i) to settle and receive the 180-day generic
exclusivity with certainty, albeit delayed until the agreed time for
entry; and (ii) to litigate and potentially lose the 180-day exclusivity
altogether.26 3 As discussed, given this incentive structure, the generic
is better off settling and receiving the generic exclusivity period with
certainty, even if entry is delayed until near the end of the patent
term and even if the patent at issue is very weak. As a result, under
the current Hatch-Waxman structure, we might not see much
difference in the timing of generic entry between weak patents and
strong patents. Whether weak or strong, the parties may simply settle
on terms that allow the generic entry during the last six months of the
patent's life.
Somewhat surprisingly, we can improve the fit between the time
for generic entry the parties will agree to through settlement and the
optimal time for generic entry, defined in (12), through a simple
change to the Hatch-Waxman rules. Rather than take away the
generic exclusivity period if the generic loses the patent litigation, we
can guarantee the 180-day generic exclusivity period for the first
paragraph IV filer whether the generic wins or loses any resulting
patent litigation.2 " While such an amendment is counterintuitive,
within the context of a variable-time-of-entry settlement, such an
approach more fully aligns the generic's interests with those of the
public.
If the 180-day period is guaranteed, even if the generic loses the
litigation, then the generic's stake in litigation becomes the value
associated with entering earlier if it wins the litigation or entering
later if it loses. Under this rule regime and a variable-time-of-entry
263. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
264. We can guarantee the 180-day period either for the last six months of the lives of
the patent at issues and cut into the value of the patents to that extent, or we can
guarantee the 180-day period at the expiration of the patents and impose on consumers
higher prices for patented pharmaceuticals for an additional six months. In calculating the
values for the Prozac example, I assume that we give the guaranteed exclusivity period at
the end of the patent's life if the generic challenger loses the litigation.
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settlement format, the generic company will be better off settling
rather than litigating so long as the time selected for generic entry
leaves it a sufficient fraction of the available generic entry rents such
that:
(1-q5(t))X, > (1-R)X,,- C,

(14)

where X, is now the difference between the present value of the
rents expected from immediate entry and those expected from
entering at the expiration of the patent, with the generic retaining the
180-day generic exclusivity in either case.
The parties will settle if they can find a time for entry that makes
both of them better off compared to litigating. Settlement will make
both better off so long as the parties can identify a time for generic
entry such that equations (9) and (14) are both satisfied. Simplifying
and solving for 0(t), we find that both equations will be satisfied so
long as:
R + (C/X,) 2 qS(t) 2 R - (C/X,).

(15)

Because all of the variables in equation (15) are positive, the
parties will always be able to find some fraction, 0(t), that satisfies
equation (15). While the exact value of #(t) will depend on the
plaintiff's chance of success, the partie.s' relevant stakes, and the
parties' respective costs of litigation, there will always be some 0(t)
that will make both parties better off settling and allowing generic
entry to begin at an appropriate time than they would be litigating.
Moreover, the parties will always settle on a 0(t) that is equal to the
plaintiff's ultimate chance of success, R, plus-or-minus a fudge factor.
As equation (15) reflects, this fudge factor will equal, on the plus side,
the defendant's costs of litigation as a fraction of the defendant's
gains from winning, and on the minus side, the plaintiff's costs of
litigation as a fraction of its gains from winning.
By guaranteeing the 180-day exclusivity period, we shape the
incentives facing the parties so that the parties will agree to a time for
generic entry that closely approximates the optimality condition,
0(t)=R. Using the numbers from the Prozac case as an example, Table
4 presents, for the thirty-four months remaining on the patents at
issue, the shortest delay for generic entry that Eli Lilly would be
willing to accept and the longest delay that Barr would be willing to
accept for: (i) a strong patent, R=80%; (ii) a medium patent, R=50%;
and (iii) a weak patent, R=20%.
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Table 4

Acceptable Range of Entry Times as a Function of Eli Lilly's
Chance of Success
R
80%
50%
20%

Earliest Acceptable Entry
27 mos.
16 mos.
7 mos.

Latest Acceptable Entry
30 mos.
20 mos.
10 mos.

While the earliest acceptable entry times remain the same as they
were under existing law, guaranteeing the 180-day exclusivity period
creates a set of incentives for the generic that move the latest
acceptable entry date forward compared to those we saw in Table 2.
For a strong patent, the latest acceptable entry date for which the
generic will agree to settle with a guaranteed exclusivity period is
thirty months, rather than thirty-two months under existing law. For a
medium patent, the latest acceptable entry date with guaranteed
exclusivity is twenty months, rather than thirty months under existing
law. For a weak patent, the latest acceptable entry date with
guaranteed exclusivity is ten months, rather than twenty-seven
months under existing law.
Rather than leave the wide range of acceptable times that we saw
under existing law, 265 guaranteeing the exclusivity period narrows the
range of acceptable entry times and ties them more closely to the
strength of the patent. A generic challenger will still pursue its own
interests, rather than those of consumers generally, and if inept, may
still settle for the latest acceptable entry time but with guaranteed
exclusivity that will be sooner than it is under current law.
By creating a set of incentives that will lead the parties to settle
on a time for entry that directly reflects the patent-holder's chance of
success, guaranteeing the exclusivity period and using the variabletime-of-entry format for settlement best advances the somewhat
conflicting goals of the patent and antitrust laws. Without the need
for outside intervention, or judicial second-guessing of a patent's
strength in subsequent antitrust litigation, such a framework leads
parties to settle on terms that directly reflect the strength of the
patent(s) at issue. Parties will settle on earlier entry for weak patents
and on later entry for strong patents. Moreover, by guaranteeing the
exclusivity period to the first filer regardless of the outcome of any
subsequent litigation, we move forward the latest entry date that will
265. See supra text accompanying notes 201-03
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prove acceptable in settlement to the generic challenger. Through
such a guarantee, we shape the incentives facing the generic
challenger so that the time of entry becomes tied more closely to the
strength of the patent and create a wide variance in the latest
acceptable entry date for weak and strong patents.
Nevertheless, restricting the parties' settlement options to a
variable-time-of-entry format and guaranteeing the generic-entry
period may create two problems. First, such a framework will make
pharmaceutical-patent litigation more difficult to settle. In order to
settle, the parties must have similar expectations regarding the
litigation's likely outcome. But they may not. For a variety of reasons,
each side may substantially overestimate its own chance of success. In
such a case, finding a time for entry that both will prefer to litigation
will prove difficult. In contrast, settling on terms that license the
generic's entry, specify a minimum retail price, and then divide the
resulting rents, offers very large potential gains in trade for the parties
to divide. Because the gains in trade are so large, particularly for
weaker patents, the parties can more readily find an allocation of
rents that make both sides better off settling rather that litigating,
even if each side overestimates its chance of success in the litigation.
Yet, if requiring parties to be realistic in their expectations regarding
the litigation's likely outcome is the price for ensuring settlements
that promote the goals of both patent and antitrust law, it seems like a
reasonably small price to pay.
Second, if the value to a generic challenger from entering sooner
rather than later becomes small relative to the costs of litigation, then
the fudge factor becomes large and the range of entry dates that will
prove acceptable to the generic challenger becomes wider. As a
general matter, the value of early entry will depend on two factors.
The first factor is the magnitude of the rents available from generic
entry. These rents will usually depend upon the size of the market for
the pharmaceutical at issue. For a drug, such as Prozac, with billions
in annual sales, the rents from generic entry, including the 180-day
generic exclusivity period, will usually be much larger than they
would be for a pharmaceutical with less market demand. This aspect
of the fudge factor is not problematic, however, as it serves as a good
proxy for the public interest associated with challenging the patents at
issue. The social cost of a weak patent increases as the size of the
market it protects and the rents it generates increase.
However, the value of early entry also depends upon a second
factor-the discount rate. In an era of very low interest rates, where
the discount rate may be close to zero, the difference in value
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between entering sooner and entering later will be correspondingly
small. At the extreme, if the discount rate were zero, a generic
challenger would have no incentive to pursue litigation if its
exclusivity period were guaranteed. With a zero discount rate, the
generic would receive the same value for the 180-day exclusivity
period whether it entered immediately or waited until the patents at
issue expired. This would remain true whether the patents at issue
were weak or strong and whether they generated substantial rents or
none at all. As a result, if a generic challenger filed a paragraph IV
certification and was sued in response, in a world with a very low
discount rate where its generic exclusivity period was guaranteed, it
would simply accept a default judgment.
While this is a potential concern for the proposed settlement
format, and while interest, and hence discount, rates are currently
very low, that represents something of a historical anomaly. If interest
rates return to their historical norms,266 then the proposed approach
should bring the private interests of the parties to pharmaceuticalpatent litigation in line with the underlying public interests at stake
and lead the parties to settle on a time for generic entry close to the
optimal. Nevertheless, we should remain aware that very low discount
rates may frustrate the proposed approach's ability to fulfill the
purposes of both patent and antitrust law as we go forward.
CONCLUSION

The strength and weakness of judicial decisionmaking is that it
primarily serves simply to resolve the dispute before the court. The
Actavis decision did a good job of resolving the dispute before it, but
it did not and, by the nature of judicial decisionmaking, could not
solve the broader problems associated with the very large and
unjustified rents that weak pharmaceutical patents can generate. As
we move forward, we are likely to observe two types of settlements
that reflect the limitations of Actavis, even if we optimistically assume
that Actavis will prove effective at discouraging anticompetitive
reverse payment settlements directly.
266. For example, George Akerlof, Kenneth Arrow, Ronald Coase, Milton Friedman,
James Buchanan, and other prominent economists used a discount rate of 7% in their
amicus brief in Eldred to evaluate the present value added by twenty additional years of
copyright protection seventy-five years into the future. See Brief for George A. Akerlof et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6-7, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
(No. 01-618); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 254-57, 268 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (using a 7% discount rate to evaluate the value of an additional twenty years
of copyright protection, seventy-five years in the future).
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First, we may see settlements that license generic entry during
the patent term, set a minimum resale price in order to maximize
profits, and then divide those rents by setting appropriate royalties
and other payments. While different in form, such a settlement
structure essentially duplicates the anticompetitive effects of a reverse
payment settlement, except the reverse payment comes in the form of
a division of expected rent. After Actavis, we may see such a licensed
entry model become the preferred method for insulating weak
patents from generic challenges.
Second, to the extent that parties embrace the variable-time-ofentry settlement structure that the Court suggested, we may see the
parties consistently agree to delay generic entry to the last six months
of the life of the patent at issue. If we see such a pattern, this would
suggest that generics are not seriously challenging weak patents but
simply settling for the guarantee of 180-day generic exclusivity the
settlement ensures, rather than risk losing the generic exclusivity
altogether in litigation.
If we see the first problem arise in the settlements that follow
Actavis, we can address it by extending the reasoning of Actavis to
find that licensed generic entry settlements violate the antitrust laws
under the rule of reason. By requiring sufficiently careful (and
expensive) antitrust scrutiny of such licensed generic entry
settlements, we can effectively encourage parties to use the variabletime-of-entry settlement format. If we see the second problem arise,
where the generic routinely settles for the latest possible entry, we
can address it by guaranteeing the generic exclusivity period to the
first paragraph IV filer, even if the first filer subsequently loses any
resulting patent litigation.
By using the variable-time-of-entry format and guaranteeing the
exclusivity period, the only settlement to which both sides would
agree will be one where the time for generic entry directly reflects the
pharmaceutical patent-holder's chance of success in the litigation. As
long as the patent laws are functioning properly, so that the patentholder's chance of success accurately reflects the strength of the
patent necessary and is sufficient to encourage the patent-holder to
devise and disclose its invention, this approach should lead to
settlements that provide a period of exclusivity and thus an incentive
that is also both necessary and sufficient for desirable innovation, as
the patent and antitrust laws require.
Requiring parties to settle only within a variable-time-of-entry
framework is not a perfect solution. Restricting settlement options
tends to cut against the "general legal policy favoring the settlement
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of disputes," a result that even the Actavis Court acknowledged. 267
Some might go further and argue that by prohibiting the parties from
settling on their preferred terms, we are effectively forcing them to
litigate. 26 8 But that would be wrong. We are not forcing the parties to
litigate; we are simply prohibiting them from settling on terms that
violate the law. At the same time, by requiring a variable-time-ofentry approach, we are both reconciling the seeming conflict between
the patent and antitrust laws and ensuring that the parties will settle
in a manner that promotes the goals of both.

267. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234.
268. Cf Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt, Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[Tlhe
district court imposed the heavy burden on trademark defendants of having to continue to
litigate when they would prefer to settle, a ruling without precedent."), overruled on other
grounds by U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 27-29 (1994).
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APPENDIX I:A SIMPLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF
INNOVATION
We can illustrate the misallocation that both under- and overprotection can generate using a simple general equilibrium model.
Imagine an economy with two types of products toward which
inventive resources can be devoted. One type is easy and requires one
unit of innovative resources to create. The other type is hard and
requires two units of innovative resources to create. However, the
hard innovations generate social value for four periods, while the easy
innovations generate value for only two periods. For both types, we
have a series of five possible innovations towards which resources can
be devoted, each generating a uniform social value each period. The
most valuable innovation generates five in each period; the second
most valuable generates four in each period; the third generates three
in each period; and so on. Given that easy innovations generate value
for two periods, the most valuable easy innovation generates ten
value; five value in each of two periods. In contrast, given that the
hard innovations generate value for four periods, the most valuable
hard innovation generates twenty value, five each for four periods.
If we assume that we have six units of innovative resources
available, then the optimal allocation is achieved when two units are
devoted to easy innovations, one each to the top two easy
innovations, and four units are devoted to hard innovations, two each
to the top two hard innovations. This allocation generates value from
the available resources of fifty-four, eighteen from the two easy
innovations and thirty-six from the two hard innovations. There is no
other allocation of the available innovative resources that will
generate more value given the available innovations in which
resources can be invested.
To illustrate how markets can work to achieve such an optimal
allocation, assume that in the absence of patent protection, innovators
capture 100% of the value of their innovation in the first period
simply from lead-time advantage and the ordinary working of the
marketplace operating against a backdrop of enforceable property
and contract rules. With patent protection, an innovator captures
100% of the value of their innovation in the second period as well.
Given these assumptions, the market will ensure the optimal
allocation of the available innovative resources if our legal rules deny
patent protection to the easy innovations and grant patent protection
to the hard innovations. Such an approach will yield an effective price
for each innovative resource of four and will lead individuals to
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devote the available innovative resources to the top two easy
innovations and the top two hard innovations-the optimal
allocation.
However, if we extend patent protection to the easy innovations
as well, then the innovative resources will be inefficiently allocated.
Instead of investing the available resources in the top two innovations
of each type, the resulting market will lead individuals to devote the
available resources to the top four easy innovations and to only the
single top hard innovation. By investing the last two innovative
resources in the third and fourth easy innovations, an innovator could
recover a total of ten for the two units,69 rather than a total of eight
for investing the same two resources in the second hard innovation.
By extending patent protection to the easy innovations, we
"overprotect" them in the sense that the resulting market leads to an
inefficient allocation of the available resources. The second hard
innovation generates more social value, at sixteen,270 but if we extend
patent protection to the easy innovations as well, there will be less
private value for the innovator. By overprotecting the easy
innovations, resources are misallocated, with resources flowing to the
less valuable, easy innovations, rather than the more valuable, hard
innovation. In our model, this leads to a reduction in social welfare
from fifty-four to forty-eight, reflecting a reduction of more than
10%.

269. The third and fourth easy innovations generate social value of three and two in
each of two periods, respectively. With patent protection for easy innovations, the
innovator captures the social value each innovation captures for both periods. By investing
in the third and fourth easy innovations, an individual would earn a total return of ten for
the two resources. In contrast, the second hard innovation generates a social value of four
for each of four periods, for a total social value of sixteen. Yet, even with patent
protection, an innovator would only capture the social value the innovation creates for two
of those four periods, or eight. Since eight is less than ten, an individual could recover
more for the last two units of innovative resources available by devoting them to the third
and fourth easy innovations, rather than to the second hard innovation.
. 270. Four units of value in each of the four periods.
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